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A multiemployer defined pension plan (MDBP) is a collectively bargained 
pension plan maintained by two or more employers and a labor union.  MDBPs pool 
risks, contributions, assets, and liabilities.  Bankruptcy by MDBP firms usually results 
in almost constant MDBP total liabilities but a shrinking pool of contributing MDBP 
employers, thus increasing MDBP liabilities for the remaining MDBP employers and 
exposing them to “liability spillover risks.”  I document the economic magnitudes of 
public firms’ MDBP liabilities and MDBP liability spillovers from other public 
companies, information relevant to both finance academics and policy makers.  I find 
five companies with 5-year expected MDBP liability spillovers exceeding 1% of their book 
assets.  One company has 1-year  expected MDBP liability spillovers exceeding 22% 
of its book assets.  On average, leverage ratios increase by 6% once MDBP liabilities and 
expected liability spillovers are consolidated into capital structure.  I investigate 
empirically whether the  risk associated with MDBP membership is systematic and is 
priced.  I propose that MDBP sharing companies share four common risks: MDBP 
liability spillover risks, MDBP unfunded liability risks, labor contract risks, and 
geographic area risks.  To test for common effects on stock returns, I regress public 
MDBP firms’ stock returns on known risk factors and extract the residuals and then regress 
the residuals against an equally weighted index of stock returns of companies with   




display positive statistically significant excess co-movement. Using an equally weighted 
MDBP index, I find statistical evidence to suggest that MDBP sharing firm’s co-
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                                                 CHAPTER 1 
 
       MULTIEMPLOYER DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS’ LIABILITY 
                                               SPILLOVERS 
 
                                        1.1 Introduction 
A multiemployer pension plan is a collectively bargained pension plan maintained 
by two or more employers, frequently within the same or related industries, and a labor 
union.  Fifty-two percent of private-sector multiemployer pension plans are defined benefit 
plans whereas only 6% of private-sector single-employer pension plans1  are defined 
benefit plans. U.S. active private-sector multiemployer defined pension plans (MDBPs) 
have one-third of the participants, one-quarter of the assets but only 3% of the number of 
private-sector single employer defined benefit pensions (SDBPs).  Therefore, the average 
MDBP has assets seven times larger than the average SDBP.  For the 2010 plan year, there 
were 1,471 U.S. active private-sector MDBPs with 10.6 million participants and $466 
billion assets as compared to 45,072 U.S active private-sector SDBPs with 30.8 million 
participants and $1,982 billion assets (U.S. Department of Labor Employee Benefits 
Security Administration, 2012). Although in aggregate, SDBPs have a larger asset base 
than MDBPs, unprecedented levels of MDBP underfunding together with MDBP ability to 
                                                          
1 Includes single employer plans, plans of controlled groups of corporations and multiemployer non-





produce liability spillovers amongst its participant companies makes MDBPs a unique and 
important area for financial research. This chapter aims at providing a detailed description 
of the structure of MDBPs and constructing MDBP liability spillover measures.  Upon 
reviewing the structure of MDBPs, it becomes evident that spillover risk is relevant.  This 
chapter provides insights into both MDBP liability spillover risks’ magnitude and 
economic significance.  
MDBPs exist predominately to allow employees in transient industries such as 
construction, retail, hotels and entertainment to keep and continue earning pension credits 
when changing jobs but still working for participating employers in the same MDBP; 
average tenure in MDBP industries is often shorter than 3 to 5 years required to vest SDBP 
pension benefits.  A joint board of trustees, equally representing labor and employers, 
govern MDBPs (Introduction to Multiemployer Plans, 2013). Unlike SDBP liabilities, 
MDBP liabilities are not mandatorily reported on public companies’ balance sheets, a 
feature which may help to explain MDBPs’ existence, but also makes the plans opaque to 
investors. 
MDBPs pool risks, contributions, assets, and liabilities.  Companies may withdraw 
from MDBPs by paying their share of the plan’s unfunded vested benefits, but frequently 
MDBP withdrawal liabilities are greater than the company’s share of the MDBP’s 
unfunded liabilities2 (Moody's, 2009) and withdrawal may be difficult without the 
agreement of the company’s unionized employees (Sanders, 2011).  In the case of 
bankruptcy, MDBP withdrawal liabilities are general unsecured claims.  Bankruptcy by 
                                                          
2 MDBP withdrawal liabilities must cover the whole of the company’s share of the MDBP underfunding. 
When a firm continues in a MDBP, the MDBP employee participants bear some of the burden of funding 





MDBP firms results in essentially constant MDBP total liabilities3 but a shrinking pool of 
contributing MDBP employers, thus increasing MDBP liabilities for the remaining MDBP 
employers.  The Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) intervenes only when 
MDBPs become insolvent (unable to pay current benefits out of plan resources), whereas 
PBGC takes over any SDBP terminated during the employer’s bankruptcy.  Through the 
mechanism described above, MDBPs expose their participant employers to “liability 
spillover risks” from other employers in the same MDBP. 
Narrative evidence suggests that MDBP employers are indeed concerned with 
“MDBP liability spillover risks.”  In a letter to The US Congress dated July 13, 2010, 
MDBP employers expressed their concerns, 
Because of the nature of multiemployer plans, when one employer goes bankrupt, 
the remaining employers in the plan become responsible for paying the accrued 
benefits of all the workers—this is often referred to as “last man standing.” As the 
number of employer participants dwindles, employers remaining in the plan see 
their liabilities increase exponentially—forcing them to cover retirees that never 
worked for them… Without a real resolution to this problem, more employers will 
be forced into bankruptcy and more workers will be left without a secure retirement. 
(Employers, Multiemployer Plan; Organizations, Employer, 2013, p. 1) 
  
Sanders (2011) describes how employer associations exist in MDBP industries in 
order to promote employers’ interests in negotiations with the unions. MDBPs are a 
mandatory part of the multiemployer bargaining process whereby an employer association 
representing competing companies will agree with a single union to one solitary collective 
bargaining agreement (CBA).  The portability of multiemployer pensions and healthcare 
                                                          
3 Anecdotal evidence suggests that in many cases MDBPs recover a small percentage of their unsecured 
withdrawal liability claims.  Judy McReynolds, President and CEO of Arkansas Best Corporation testified 
in front of the United States House Committee on Education and Workforce Subcommittee on Health, 
Employment, Labor and Pensions on June 20, 2012,“Many withdrawals have occurred in the bankruptcy 
context, and plans typically collect only pennies on the dollar of the withdrawal liabilities owed by these 





plans weakens the power of any one employer over unionized employees.  Unions demand 
that their members belong to the same MDBP especially across the same geographical area 
and if the majority of employers in the employer association want to continue the MDBP, 
the employer association will bargain to continue the MDBP. Sanders describes how the 
multiemployer bargaining structure promotes the interests of the industry’s leading 
employers by creating an anticompetitive cartel whose rents are shared with the unions in 
the form of higher wages and benefits and whose weapons for policing the employer 
association’s membership include MDBPs. 
At first glance, given the many curious features of MDBPs, one wonders why 
MDBPs originated and why MDBPs still exist.  The most pertinent question is: Why do 
large credit-worthy firms belong to MDBPs together with smaller less credit-worthy firms? 
More credit-worthy MDBP employers may be compensated for providing essentially free 
insurance to less credit-worthy MDBP employers by the ability to offer lower salaries and 
benefits package in return for providing portable pensions to their transient employees 
and/or, as Sanders (2011) argues, extracting customer rents.  The question of why MDBPs 
originated is far easier to answer.  MDBPs first appeared in the late 1930s and 1940s in 
order to provide pension benefits to the unionized workforce in transitory employment or 
who worked for small employers (Segal, 2007).  Before 1980, employers could share 
pension administrative costs and pool employees’ longevity risk without exposure to 
MDBP withdrawal liabilities.  Moreover, risk pooling ensured that MDBP employees’ 
retirement benefits were less threatened by an individual employer’s financial difficulties 
than SDBP employees’ retirement benefits.4   
                                                          





In this chapter, I provide economic analysis of U.S. MDBPs, a little known but 
economically important part of the U.S. pension system.  While single-employer defined 
benefit pension plans have taken the spotlight, there is almost no academic or practitioner 
research on MDBPs.  I document the economic magnitudes of public firms’ MDBP liability 
spillovers from other firms with whom the firm shares MDBPs, information relevant to 
both finance academics and policy makers.  I examine two cases, first “last man standing” 
(LMS hereafter) MDBP liability spillovers where I assume all private and public major  
contributing companies go bankrupt except the company for whom I calculate LMS MDBP 
liability spillovers and second expected MDBP liability spillovers from other major 
contributing public firms. 
My dissertation makes several important contributions concerning MDBPs.  First, 
I provide the first comprehensive quantification of MDBP liability spillovers.  Second, my 
research increases the understanding of default correlation amongst public U.S. firms that 
contribute to MDBPs, an understanding which is essential for firms and investors who seek 
to diversify their exposure to correlated risks.  Finally, and most importantly, my research 
can inform the PBGC’s simulation models and therefore U.S. policy makers. 
More informed PBGC simulation models minimize the risk of taxpayers providing 
funds to an insolvent PBGC.  The PBGC only covers MDBP participants’ pensions up to 
an annual maximum of $12,870 as opposed to an annual maximum of $57,480 for SDBP 
participants’ pensions.  The PBGC’s 2012 report noted that the multiemployer insurance 
program had liabilities of $7 billion and assets of $1.8 billion and estimates that by 2022 
the multiemployer insurance program will have a mean deficit of $32 billion.  Mitchell 





PBGC than single employer plan insurance underfunding.  The Congressional Budget 
Office projects that the PBGC will run out of money in 7 years. PBGC Director Josh 
Gotbaum commented, "If Congress allows the PBGC to get the money and the authority it 
needs to do its job, then these [multiemployer] plans can be preserved," he added, “If not, 
the PBGC will run out of money, too, and multiemployer pensioners will get virtually 
nothing.  This is not something that can wait a few years.  If people kick the can down the 
road, they'll find it went off a cliff" (Williams Walsh, 2014).  My research documents LMS 
MDBP liability spillovers onto public companies and expected MDBP liability spillovers 
amongst MDBP public companies informing PBGC’s estimation of MDBP company 
bankruptcy probabilities. 
In my dissertation, I exploit the 2009 and 2010 plan year MDBP Form 5500 
Schedule R filings to calculate and expected MDBP liability spillovers from publicly 
available information.  MDBPs file Form 5500 with the Department of Labor (DOL) to 
satisfy the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and Internal 
Revenue Code annual reporting requirements.  For the 2009 plan year, for the first time, 
MDBPs made mandatory disclosures on Form 5500 Schedule R about employers making 
more than 5% of the total plan year contributions.  MDBPs filed their 2009 Form 5500s 
between June 2010 and August 2011.  Prior to 2012, few companies disclosed in their 
public filings the names of their MDBPs5; therefore, for the vast majority of 2009 Form 
5500 Schedule R filing released new public information about companies contributing the 
same MDBP.  The new information consisted of the employer’s name, the employer 
identification number (EIN), the employer’s annual contribution, CBA expiration date(s), 
                                                          
5 Some notable exceptions are Arkansas Best and YRC Worldwide who both disclosed in their 10-Ks that 





and contribution rate information.  Plan administrators filed the 2009 plan information 
electronically6 and the public could view the MDBP’s Form 5500 filings through the DOL 
Website (www.efast.dol.gov) or in the Washington public disclosure room within 24 hours 
of the DOL’s filing receipt.7 
For the 2009 plan year, the average MDBP company (out of 131) has a 2.6 times 
larger market capitalization, is 40% more levered, and has a lower market to book ratio 
than the average Compustat company (out of 3,369). In aggregate, 154 public companies 
are responsible for $23.9 billion Schedule R MDBP liabilities; hereafter I refer to Schedule 
R MDBP liabilities as MDBP liabilities.8 The transportation sector accounts for half 
(51.8%) of the aggregate MDBP liabilities and the food/retail sector accounts for 29% of 
the aggregate MDBP liabilities.   
I calculate LMS MDBP liability spillovers where I assume that all Schedule R 
companies go bankrupt except for the public Schedule R company for whom I calculate 
the LMS MDBP liability spillovers. Eight companies have LMS MDBP liability spillovers 
larger than 10% of their book assets and 31 companies have LMS MDBP liability 
spillovers larger than 1% of their book assets.  
Five firms have 5-year expected MDBP liability spillovers from other public 
companies bigger than 1% of their market value of equity.  Sixteen public companies have 
1-year expected MDBP liability spillovers from other public companies larger than 0.1% 
of their market value of equity.  For these 16 companies, the mean 1-year expected MDBP 
                                                          
6 From January 2010, all pension and welfare plans had to file Form 5500 electronically using the EFAST2 
system. 
7 http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq-EFAST2.html:  Questions 42 and 43.  
8 Public Companies may have non-Schedule R liabilities when the company contributes less than 5% of the 





liability spillovers as a percentage of market value of equity is 7.3% (median 0.4%) and 
the mean 1-year expected MDBP liability spillovers as a percentage of total assets is 1.9% 
(median 0.2%).  Three companies have extremely large 1-year expected MDBP liability 
spillovers as a percentage of their market value of equity: Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea 
Company (74.8%), Arkansas Best Corp (32.0%), and YRC Worldwide (5.6%), generating 
severe positive skewness in the distribution of 1-year expected MDBP liability spillovers 
as a percentage of market value of equity. 
I calculate expected MDBP liability spillovers over a 1-year period and a 5-year 
period.  On average, firm 5-year expected MDBP liability spillovers are 2.6 times larger 
than firm 1-year expected MDBP liability spillovers.  My calculations reveal that expected 
MDBP liability spillovers from other public companies is not an issue for the majority of 
public MDBP companies. However my calculations do not include expected MDBP 
liability spillovers from private and non-Schedule R public companies or account for 
default correlation amongst MDBP companies. 
Other Schedule R public companies, Schedule R private companies, and non-
Schedule R companies expose public Schedule R Companies to MDBP liability spillovers.  
In my sample, on average, other public Schedule R companies’ liabilities account for just 
16.3% (median 7.4%) of the total liabilities from all three sources. Therefore, my calculated 
expected MDBP liability spillovers are most likely a small percentage of the total expected 
MDBP liability spillovers.  On the other hand, companies usually share MDBPs with 
companies in the same industry and my expected MDBP liability spillover calculations do 
not account for positive competitive effects in the event of bankruptcy. 





participants by Form 5500 filings peaked at the end of April 2011 at $558.0 million, the 
$217.7 million expected MDBP liability spillover from YRC Worldwide onto Arkansas 
Best accounted for 39% of the aggregate expected spillover, the food/retail sector for one 
third (33.8%) of the aggregate spillover and the mines/coal/oil sector for 11.7% of the 
aggregate spillover.  Expected MDBP liability spillovers exist primarily between 
companies in the same broad industry group.  At the end of April 2011, on average 95.3% 
of expected 1-year MDBP liability spillovers arose from companies within the same broad 
industry group.  
Hostess Brands filed for bankruptcy on January 11, 2012 blaming troubles with its 
pension and medical benefits obligations, increased competition and economic conditions 
(Newspaper Article: Twinkies maker Hostess seeks bankruptcy protection, 2012).  Eight 
MDBPs were listed amongst Hostess’s top 10 unsecured creditors.  Hostess’s largest 
unsecured claim for $944 million was from Bakery and Confectionary Union and Industry 
International Pension Fund. Bishop (2013) reports,  
Bimbo Bakeries USA [which shared many MDBPs with Hostess] objected 
Thursday to attempts by Hostess Brands Inc. to use its bankruptcy case to pull out 
of 24 multi-employer pension funds, saying Hostess's $2 billion pension obligations 
would be unfairly dumped onto Bimbo and other employers.  The Grupo Bimbo 
SAB subsidiary claims that if the other contributing employers are unable to 
withstand the financial impact of Hostess’s avoidance of its fiscal obligations to the 
funds, smaller competitors may become insolvent, and the funds themselves may 
suffer “catastrophic failure,” causing severe harm to employees and retirees.  
Moreover, even if the funds survived, Bimbo would end up shouldering a 
significant portion of Hostess’s unpaid withdrawal liability, driving up its own 
costs, both current and contingent, according to its objection. (p. 1) 
 
This case highlights that private company MDBP liability spillovers can be large 
and my documented public company MDBP expected liability spillovers are most likely a 






Although the academic finance literature has paid little attention to MDBPs, 
unfunded MDBP liabilities are potentially relevant in assessing corporate securities.  
Rating agencies view a company’s share of MDBP unfunded liabilities as a debt-like 
company liability (Moody's, 2006) and since 2006, rating agencies have incorporated 
estimates of unfunded MDBP liabilities into the information they use to rate bond issues. 
In March 2012, a Credit Suisse equity research report estimated that U.S. MDBPs are in 
aggregate 52% funded.  MDBPs have more than one contributing employer therefore 
underfunded MDBPs result in expected MDBP liability spillovers.  Zion, Varshney, and  
Burnap (2012) comment,  
With the plans in bad shape, the companies that have multiemployer exposure could 
get hit from a number of angles, including increased contributions to the plans 
resulting in a drain on cash flows and a hit to earnings.  Withdrawal liabilities could 
increase too, driving up the price of pulling out of a multiemployer pension plan.  
It may even impact M and A as an acquirer is going to pay less (all else equal) for 
a company with heavy exposure to underfunded multiemployer plans.  In addition, 
as the multiemployer exposure becomes clearer, investors may decide that certain 
companies are more expensive than they initially appear after factoring in this off-
balance-sheet liability.  Even credit ratings could be impacted if the ratings agencies 
are able to gain new insight about a company’s share of multiemployer 
underfunding and its impact on future cash flows. (p. 2) 
 
MDBPs’ unique institutional features generate numerous unexplored financial 
effects.  In my dissertation, I focus on MDBP liability spillovers but as Credit Suisse 
highlights, MDBPs have far reaching financial implications.  Previously, little information 
was available on companies’ MDBP exposure. However, the new schedule R information 
together with the new 10-K “significant” MDBP disclosures have drastically improved 
information on companies’ MDBP exposure, providing a fertile area for financial research. 





literature review.  Section 1.3 describes MDBP institutional details.  Section 1.4 describes 
the data collection, MDBP unfunded liability calculations, and LMS and expected MDBP 
liability spillover calculations.  Section 1.5 explains how I incorporate MDBP unfunded 
liabilities and 1-year expected MDBP liability spillovers into leverage calculations.  
Section 1.6 describes the MDBP public company sample selection.  Section 1.7 describes 
MDBP characteristics and public company MDBP liabilities.  Section 1.8 summarizes 
public company LMS MDBP liability spillovers and expected MDBP liability spillovers 
and summarizes the public company expected MDBP liability spillover information 
available to market participants from Form 5500 filings from July 2010 through November 
2011.  Section 1.9 concludes. 
 
                                         1.2 Literature Review 
My research is related to three strands of literature: default correlation, contagion 
effects, and research on SDBPs.  My study is primarily related to the financial distress 
contagion literature.   
All else equal, expected MDBP liability spillovers increase a firm’s own default 
probability and increase correlations amongst MDBP sharing firm’s default probabilities. 
Merton (1974) models equity as a call option on a firm’s assets with the call’s exercise 
price equal to the value of the firm’s liabilities; when an under-funded MDBP firm files 
for bankruptcy, the MDBP liabilities of other firms in the same MDBP increase.  This 
essentially increases the nonbankrupt MDBP firm asset call option’s exercise price and 
decreases equity value.   





counterparty might affect its own default probability and introduce counterparty risk to 
Lando’s (1994, 1998) reduced form model9 by adding a jump process to the set of state 
variables.  MDBP liability spillover risks are “looped” because companies in the same 
MDBP are all exposed to each others’ MDBP liabilities when participant companies file 
for bankruptcy.  Jarrow and Yu model a two company looping default and show that 
counterparty risk nonlinearly increases default probability.   
Traditional default models using macroeconomic common factors fail to produce 
levels of default clustering observed in data (Das, Duffie, Kapadia, & Saita, 2007).  Jorion 
and Zhang (2009) show that counterparty risk increases a company’s own default 
probability.  Using simulation, the authors analyze defaults of 500 companies generated 
first by a conventional factor model (LMS 1-year default probability of 1% and a 0.20 pair-
wise default correlation coefficient) and then by adding counterparty risk to the baseline 
model (three counterparties for each company with a 30% debt recovery rate).  With 
counterparty risk, the default correlation increases to 0.0262 from a baseline default 
correlation of 0.0243.  Furthermore, the simulation results support the hypothesis that 
counterparty risk contributes to the fat tails observed in default distributions.  With 
counterparty risk, the default distribution’s 99.99th percentile increases from 115 to 127 
defaults.  
MDBP liability spillover risks share many characteristics with counterparty risks, 
and MDBP bankrupt companies can increase the liabilities of companies with whom they 
share MDBPs, thus increasing the bankruptcy correlation amongst MDBP sharing 
companies.  My research documents public companies’ expected MDBP liability spillovers 
                                                          
9 Lando’s model uses a doubly stochastic Poisson process to account for the dependency between credit 





and documents an additional source of U.S. company financial distress contagion namely 
expected MDBP liability spillovers. 
Generally, an individual MDBP covers unionized employees in the same industry. 
Therefore, companies who share MDBPs are often competitors.  Lang and Stulz (1992) 
find that on average the market value of a value-weighted portfolio of the bankrupt firm’s 
competitors’ common stock declines by a statistically significant 1% at the time of the 
bankruptcy announcement.  The authors define the contagion effect as the change in value 
of competitors that cannot be attributed to the bankrupt firm’s wealth distribution and 
define the competitive effect as the wealth gain experienced by competitors because the 
bankruptcy conveys information about the competitive positions of firms in the bankrupt 
firm’s industry.  The authors find evidence of both a contagion effect and a competitive 
effect amongst their results.  For industries with a debt-to-asset ratio exceeding the sample 
median, they find the value of the competitors’ equity falls by 3% on average, providing 
evidence that for these firms the contagion effect dominates, whereas, in less competitive 
industries10 with  low leverage competitors’ equity increases by 2.2%, providing evidence 
that for these firms the competitive effect dominates. 
Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers (2008) find significant contagion effects for 
suppliers of bankruptcy filing firms in both the filing period and prefiling distress period; 
furthermore, they find more severe significant supplier contagion effects when the 
bankruptcy filing firm’s industry experiences contagion effects.  The authors find that the 
average filing-period abnormal return for supplier portfolio is -1.94%; this abnormal return 
decreases to -4.76% when the authors restrict the sample to bankruptcy firms where  the 
                                                          
10 Less competitive industries are defined as industries where the Herfindahl index (a proxy for imperfect 





bankruptcy filing firm’s industry experiences contagion effects. 
Jorion and Zhang (2009) provide empirical evidence that counterparty risk is an 
important credit contagion mechanism.  The authors examine unsecured creditors’ 
abnormal stock returns and credit default swap (CDS) spread changes around bankruptcy 
events and document an average 11-day window industry-adjusted cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) of -2.29% for 230 industrial creditors.11  The authors find that within two 
years of the bankruptcy filing, 2.60% of credit rated industrial creditors are delisted, 
whereas only 0.56% of matched control sample firms are delisted; the difference in 
population percentages is statistically significant from zero at the 1% level.   Furthermore, 
32.32% of credit rated industrial creditors are downgraded within 2 years of the bankruptcy 
event in comparison to only 12.36% of matched control sample firms; the difference in 
population percentages is statistically significant from zero at the 1% level. Vassalou and 
Xing (2004) explain that default risk contagion effects may result in a systematic 
component to default risk.  Using Merton’s (1974) model to measure default risk, the 
authors find that default risk is systematic; specifically, they add the change in aggregate 
survival rate12 as an explanatory variable to CAPM and three-factor Fama and French 
(1993) regressions and find that the change in aggregate survival rate has a positive and 
significant risk premium. 
Shivdasani and Stefanescu (2010) show that public firms’ leverage ratios are about 
35% higher when SDBPs are brought back onto the balance sheet.  The authors find that 
on average, the tax benefits from SDBPs account for about 1.5% of the value of the firm.  
                                                          
11 Trade credit accounts for 98% of the debts owed to industrial creditors. 
12 Survival rate is defined as one minus the probability of default.  Change in survival rate is defined as 





The authors do not examine MDBPs. 
 
                            1.3 MDBP Institutional Background 
1.3.1 Employer and Employee MDBP Advantages 
MDBPs provide advantages to both employers and employees.  The International 
Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans highlights the many advantages of MDBPs: Mobile 
employees earn and retain their benefits when working for various participating employers 
in the same MDBP.  The centralized plan administration increases benefits and/or reduces 
participating employer costs.  Employers’ risk and resources are pooled and accordingly 
MDBPs pay much lower insurance premiums to the PBGC than SDBPs.  Multiemployer 
plans have access to investment and consulting advice which would be cost prohibitive for 
smaller plans. Employer MDBP contributions are tax deductible (International Foundation 
of Employee Benefit Plans, 2013). 
 
1.3.2 Valuing MDBP Liabilities 
MDBP liabilities are obscure and difficult to value.  Unlike SDBP liabilities, 
aggregate MDBP liabilities are not recorded on public company balance sheets, and 
actuaries, rating agencies and financial services companies use different interest rates to 
discount MDBP liabilities.  In contrast to SDBP actuaries who for funding purposes must 
use interest rates based on current investment grade corporate bond yields to discount 
pension liabilities, MDBP actuaries may use the valuation rate, an interest rate that reflects 
long term expectation of investment earnings given the plan’s investment structure to 





et al. (2012) find that the median valuation rate for the 2010 MDBP year was 7.5% whereas 
the median 2011 discount rate for SDBP liabilities for S&P 500 companies was 4.7%. 
Therefore MDBP liabilities would be larger if they were discounted at the SDBP discount 
rate. 
 
1.3.3 Withdrawal Liability 
 
MDBPs are governed by The 1974 Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA); in 1980, Congress passed the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments 
(MPAA) which introduced a withdrawal liability.  Employers who wish to withdraw from 
a MDBP must pay their share of the plan’s unfunded vested pension benefits.   Withdrawal 
liabilities can be paid as a lump sum or paid over a period, generally up to 20 years with 
interest.  Solvent employers may withdraw voluntarily from a MDBP by paying a 
withdrawal liability.   Plant closures, rejection of CBAs and redundancies can all trigger 
compulsory withdrawal liabilities for solvent employers.  When an employer’s 
contribution base shrinks by at least 70%, employers must pay a partial withdrawal 
liability.  A MDBP only files a claim during a chapter 11 bankruptcy if the employer 
withdraws from the MDBP prior to the bankruptcy filing or during the bankruptcy process.  
If an employer is insolvent and undergoing liquation or dissolution when it withdraws, 50% 
of the withdrawal liability is contingent on whether there is sufficient liquidation or 
dissolution value after all the other employer’s debts are paid (Mazo & Lee, 2010). 
ERISA requires that the computation of a MDBP’s withdrawal liability is based on 
the actuary’s best estimate of anticipated experience under the plan and reasonable 





or a blended rate, which is a weighted average of the valuation rate and the PBGC annuity 
purchase rate,13 to discount vested pension liabilities (Mazo & Lee, 2010).  The PBGC 
January 2010 annuity purchase rate was 4.89% for the first 20 years and 4.63% thereafter, 
respectively. In the event of a “mass withdrawal” (all employers or “substantially all” 
withdrawing from a plan) withdrawal liability calculations use vested liabilities discounted 
with the PBGC annuity rate and the market value of plan assets, whereby stocks are valued 
using stock market prices and bonds are priced using market prices and discounted cash 
flow analysis. 
MDBP actuaries use different valuation methods to calculate withdrawal liabilities. 
The Segal Company, a prominent MDBP consulting actuarial firm, calculates withdrawal 
liabilities using a blended discount rate and the market value of plan assets for the Laborers 
Pension Trust Fund for Northern California in a report dated May 31, 2011.  Segal actuaries  
discount 40.9% (market value of assets divided by vested liabilities discounted with the 
PBGC annuity rate) of the vested pension liabilities at the PBGC annuity rate and discount 
the remaining vested pension liabilities at the 7.5% valuation (The Segal Group Inc, 2013).  
In contrast, the Steelworkers Pension Trust (Steelworkers Pension Trust Explanation of 
Withdrawal Liability, 2013) calculates withdrawal liabilities using the valuation discount 
rate (7.25%) and the Indiana teamsters’ pension fund actuarial report dated January 1, 
2012, assesses withdrawal liabilities using a valuation discount rate (7.25%) and the 
smoothed actuarial value of the plan assets (United Actuarial Services, 2013). 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that it may be optimal for credit worthy companies to 
withdraw from poorly funded MDBPs when they share the plan with other less credit 
                                                          
13 The PBGC annuity purchase rate is the interest rate used to value MDBP benefits and certain assets 





worthy companies.  United Parcel Services (UPS) withdrew from the Central States, 
Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund (Central States hereafter) at the end of 2007.  
At the time, UPS was the biggest contributor to the Central States with Arkansas Best and 
YRC Worldwide the other major contributors to the plan.  The Central States was 60.5% 
funded as of November 1, 2005.  At the end of 2007, Standard and Poor’s rated UPS’ long 
term bonds AAA, several notches above Arkansas Best bonds’ BBB+ rating and YRC 
Worldwide bonds’ BBB- rating. UPS paid a $6.1 billion pretax withdrawal payment to the 
Central States and set up a new UPS plan for its employees formperly covered by the 
Central States.  More recently, on September 16, 2012, UPS withdrew from the 41.4% 
funded New England Teamsters and Trucking Industry Pension Fund, incurring a $1.2 
billion withdrawal liability.  The above UPS examples illustrate that companies will 
optimally exercise the real option to withdraw from a MDBP when the MDBP is seriously 
underfunded and they share the MDBP with less credit worthy companies than themselves.  
Realized MDBP withdrawal liabilities are recorded as contingent liabilities in a company’s 
financial statements. 
 
1.3.4 MDBP Partition 
MDBP partition occurs when the PBGC separates the liabilities and equitable assets 
of bankrupt companies’ plan participants into a new plan and the liabilities and equitable 
assets of nonbankrupt companies’ plan participants into another new plan. ERISA Section 
4233 allows the PBGC to partition a MDBP under very specific circumstances: 
1. The bankruptcy of contributing employer(s) will or has resulted in a substantial 





2. The MDBP is likely to become insolvent14; 
3. Contributions will have to be increased significantly in plan reorganization to 
meet the minimum contribution requirement and prevent insolvency; and 
4. Partition will significantly reduce the likelihood that the remaining plan will 
become insolvent.    
The new bankrupt companies’ plan participant benefits are limited to the PBGC 
guarantee of up to $12,870 per year for a participant with 30 years of service and the PBGC 
loans money to the new plan to pay benefits and essential administration costs.  The PBGC 
makes no interventions in the remaining plan. 
To date, the PBGC has only partitioned three MDBPs: one in the 1980s, the 
Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers and Warehouse Workers Union Pension Plan in 2010 and 
the Bakery and Sales Drivers Local 33 Industry Pension Fund in 2014.  In 2014, the PBGC 
created a new plan with former Hostess participants.  The average Hostess retiree’s benefits 
were reduced from $650 per month to about $520 per month (PBGC, 2014). 
 
1.3.5 MDBP Mergers 
Two or more MDBPs may merge to create a new plan subject to the requirements 
of section 4321.3 of ERISA.  The most important ERISA requirements are the following: 
no participant’s or beneficiary’s accrued benefit is lower after the effective date of the 
merger than immediately before the merger date and the new plan must pass a solvency 
test.   
 
                                                          





1.3.6 MDBP Claims in Bankruptcy 
When a contributing MDBP employer withdraws from a MDBP before or during 
bankruptcy, the MDBP withdrawal liability claim is a general unsecured claim in the 
bankruptcy court.  In the event of a withdrawal from an MDBP postbankruptcy petition, 
some courts have granted administrative claim status to MDBP benefits earned between 
the petition date and the MDBP withdrawal date.  In the event of the company’s liquidation, 
50% of the MDBP withdrawal liability claim is an unsecured general claim and the 
remaining 50% of the withdrawal liability claim is a subordinated debt, behind other debt 
claims but in front of equity claims. 
 
1.3.7 MDBP Funding Status 
The Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA 2006) plans mandates that MDBPs 
provide an annual plan status certifications based on standardized funding and liquidity 
measures for determining the financial health of plans.  Actuaries calculate MDBPs’ 
funded percentage by dividing the smoothed actuarial value of plan assets by plan liabilities 
discounted at the valuation rate.  Plans are certified as either in critical, endangered or non-
distressed status.  Critical status is usually associated with funding ratios less than 65% 
whereas endangered status is associated with funding levels greater than 65% but less than 
80%.  Two-thirds of MDBPs were in critical or endangered status in the 2009 plan year 
(Department of Labor, Department of The Treasury and PBGC, 2013). PPA 2006 mandates 
that critical or endangered status MDBPs address under-funding through increased 
employer contributions and/or reductions in adjustable benefits. 





assets plummeted with the 2000 to 2002 market decline and the 2008 financial crisis.  The 
decline of unionization across U.S. industry, obsolete and bankrupt MDBP employers and 
the decline in the percentage of active (current contributing employer) participants has 
eroded MDBPs’ employer contribution base.  Prior to PPA 2006, the U.S. tax code deterred 
plans from overfunding and protecting themselves from market and industry downturns 
since employer contributions were only tax-deductible when MDBPs were less than 100% 
funded.  During the 1990s, more than 75% of MDBPs increased liabilities by raising 
benefits so that employers could receive current tax deductions on contractually required 
MDBP contributions (Department of Labor, Department of The Treasury and PBGC, 
2013).  Furthermore, increasing multiemployer healthcare costs diverted employer 
contributions from the longerterm requirement of funding pension plans.  CBAs set MDBP 
employers contributions, usually for a 2- or 3-year period, making it difficult for MDBPs 
to quickly respond to funding deficiencies. 
 
1.3.8 Companies’ MDBP Disclosure Requirements 
For fiscal years ending on or before December 15, 2011, public companies were 
only required to disclose their total contributions to MDBPs; however, some companies 
voluntarily disclosed more detailed information. For example, Kroger discloses their best 
estimate of their aggregate MDBP withdrawal liability in their 10-Ks and Arkansas Best 
Freight and YRC Worldwide disclose that they are major contributors to the Central States 
in their 10-Ks.   
In September 2011, the Federal Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued 





in a Multiemployer Plan.” The new disclosures include employer contributions made to 
each significant plan and to all plans in the aggregate, an indication of whether the 
employer’s contributions represent more than 5% of total contributions to the plan, an 
indication of which plans are subject to a funding improvement plan, the expiration date(s) 
of the CBA(s) and any minimum funding arrangements, the most recent certified funded 
status of the plan,  and a description of the nature and effect of any changes affecting 
comparability for each period in which a statement of income is presented.  The funded 
status of the plan allows investors to estimate the MDBPs’ degree of underfunding.  
However, in order to estimate a company’s MDBP liability, investors require the 10-K 
employer contribution information together with Form 5500 information.  The new MDBP 
disclosures were effective for public company for fiscal years ending after December 15, 
2011, with early adoption permitted.  Private companies were required to adopt the new 
MDBP disclosures for fiscal years ending after December 15, 2012.   
 
                                            1.4 Data Collection 
MDBPs must file Form 5500 to satisfy ERISA and IRS annual reporting 
requirements.  Form 5500 contains information on MDBP assets, liabilities, and major 
employer contributions.  From the 2009 plan year onwards, investors can estimate MDBP 
liabilities of major contributing companies using Form 5500 information; however, it is 
necessary to link subsidiaries to their parents in order to obtain good estimates of a public 
company’s total MDBP liabilities.  For fiscal years ending after December 15, 2011, 
investors can use 10-K information together with Form 5500 information to estimate public 





website (http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/foia/foia-5500.html).  I merge the 2009 Form 5500 (All) 
data with the 2009 Form 5500 schedule H, schedule MB and schedule R data using the 
MDBP filing’s unique key.  The original dataset contains information on MDBPs, SDBPs, 
multiemployer plans and direct filing entities therefore I select MDBPs with filing status 
not equal to ‘processing_stopped’.15  In order to assemble data on MDBP contributing 
employers, I select MDBPs with Schedule R attached.  The 2009 MDBP datasets contain 
some filings from previous years so I select plans where the MDBP valuation year is 2009, 
if the MDBP valuation date is missing, I include the MDBP if the year of the MDBP’s 
form begin date is 2009.  I delete observations for which either Form 5500 Schedule R’s 
RPA94 liability is missing or Form 5500 Schedule H’s end of year net plan assets are 
missing. MDBPs are uniquely identified by their employer identification number and their 
plan number but may have multiple filings; where there are multiple filings for the same 
plan, I select the plan filing with the earliest filing date and contributing employer Schedule 
R information. 
I collect data for both public parent companies and their subsidiaries. Form 5500 
schedule R lists both the contributing employer’s name and the contributing employer’s 
employer identification number (EIN).  I wish to match Schedule R subsidiaries to their 
public parent companies. However, as Rauh, Stefanescu, and Zeldes (2013) explain, a 
subsidiary’s EIN often differs from its parent’s Compustat EIN:  
Under the current IRS rules, subsidiaries that are at least 80% owned by the parent 
may elect to file consolidated income tax returns. But they can also choose to file 
taxes separately while still remaining consolidated with the parent company for 
financial purposes. In this case, the EIN and the sponsor name reported in Form 
5500 will differ from its parent’s. (p. 12) 
 
                                                          
15 EFAST2 Program Management Office personnel informed me that the public could view ‘filing_error’ 





In order to match Schedule R companies to their public parents, I first follow Rauh 
et al. (2013) and match the Schedule R company’s EIN to their public parent’s EIN.  For 
companies that cannot be matched using their EIN, I search Hoover’s database for potential 
public parents using the Schedule R company name.  Companies may use the same name 
so I use the industry and the MDBP location to identify the correct Hoover’s company.   
When Hoover’s lists a potential public parent for the Schedule R company, I search 
Exhibit 21 (listing of active subsidiaries) of the most recent public parent’s 10-K available 
before the Form 5500 filing date, for the Schedule R company name.  If the company is 
not listed on Exhibit 21, I search the rest of the public company’s 10-K for mention of the 
Schedule R listed company.  Public companies need only list in Exhibit 21 their 
“significant” subsidiaries who contribute more than 10% of consolidated assets or pretax 
income at the end of the last fiscal year (Lignon & Malm, 2013). Therefore, if a Schedule 
R company is not listed in Exhibit 21 or mentioned in the 10-K, I ascertain whether the 
Schedule R company’s website discloses that it is a subsidiary of the parent public 
company.16  If I still cannot verify the Hoover’s Schedule R company match to its public 
parent, I search the internet to see whether the employer EIN is associated with a public 
company’s pension plans.  I also use einfinder.com to match Schedule R company’s EINs 
with a public company.  I also search the internet for court documents or news stories that 
may link the Form 5500 company to its public parent.  
I require that a Form 5500 company can be matched to a public company parent in 
at least two ways to enter my sample.  I require that a MDBP has at least one U.S. 
incorporated public firm listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX exchanges on the plan’s 
                                                          





filing to enter my sample.  I delete companies making a withdrawal liability payment to 
the MDBP because these companies no longer belong to the MDBP and are not exposed 
to MDBP liability spillovers.  When an individual MDBP has two or more observations 
for the same public company, I add together the pension contributions amounts and 
consolidate the public employer information into one MDBP public company observation. 
In order to analyze expected MDBP liability spillovers inter- and intraindustry, I 
assign public companies to 10 broad industry groups: transportation, food/retail, 
entertainment/printing, construction/engineering/steel, mines/coal/oil, hotels/casinos, 
aircraft, waste management, paper/paperboard, and other.  My industry groupings are 
inspired by Moody’s (2009) industry groupings and frequently observed additional 
industries seen in the data.  In contrast to Moody’s, I include a waste management industry 
group since I observed several MDBPs where the contributing Schedule R employers 
belonged to the waste management industry. 
I collect public company’s total MDBP employer contributions from the public 
company’s 10-K. In my sample, 2009 plan year MDBP year ends vary from December 31, 
2009, until November 30, 2010, with the majority (56%) of MDBP plan years ending on 
December 31, 2009, and 88% ending on or before June 30, 2010.  Public companies may 
belong to several MDBPs; it is therefore difficult to obtain an exact date match between a 
company’s reported 10-K total MDBP employer contributions and the public company’s 
total Schedule R contributions.  I therefore use the following methodology to collect public 
company total employer MDBP contributions.  If the company’s fiscal year ends on or 
before June 30, 2010, I use the most recent reported fiscal year total employer MDBP 





the 2009 and 2010 fiscal year total MDBP contributions.  If a company does not report its 
2009 fiscal year total MDBP contributions, I use the 2010 fiscal year total MDBP 
contributions. 
In order to summarize MDBP liability spillover information available to market 
participants, I calculate expected MDBP liability spillovers from publicly available Form 
5500 filings on a monthly basis from July 30, 2010 to November 30, 2011.  I choose an 
initial date of July 30, 2010 because the date of the first 2009 plan year MDBP Form 5500 
filing with at least two public companies is July 28, 2010.  I chose a final date of the 
November 30, 2010, because for fiscal years ending after December 15, 2011, public 
companies must disclose their significant MDBPs.  Therefore, after December 15, 2011, 
both public company 10-Ks and MDBP Form 5500 filings contain information about 
expected MDBP liability spillovers. 
I calculate expected MDBP liability spillovers on a rolling monthly basis. If a 
MDBP filed its 2010 plan year information before the month’s end date, I replace the 
MDBP’s 2009 plan year information with its 2010 plan year information.  I also add 
information from 2010 plan year MDBP filings for plans that are not included in my 2009 
plan year data set but list at least one of the EINS associated with my 2009 plan year public 
companies in their 2010 plan year Schedule R.  In order to calculate bankruptcy 
probabilities, I follow  I calculate Altman (1968) Z-scores from Compustat data with 
company fiscal year ends at least 4 months before the MDBP public release date to ensure 






1.4.1 Calculating a Company’s Share of Unfunded MDBP Liabilities  
Generally for MDBP plan years beginning after 2007, the statutory interest rate 
used to discount current pension liability must be between 90% and 105% of the weighted 
average of the rates of interest on 30-year Treasury securities during the 4-year period 
ending on the last day before the beginning of the plan year.  The present value of pension 
benefits accrued to date discounted at the statutory interest rate is called the RPA 94 current 
liability.  Moody’s (2006) uses the RPA 94 current liability because it is a standard liability 
measure across companies whereas actuarial liabilities can vary across companies both in 
the actual discount rate used and the methodology.  Moody’s use RPA 94 current liability 
multiplied by 90% less current assets and multiplied by 50% to estimate a MDBP’s 
unfunded liability.  I follow Moody’s (2006) methodology to estimate a MDBP’s unfunded 
liability; specifically, I subtract Form 5500 Schedule H’s end of year net plan assets from 
90% of Form 5500’s Schedule MB RPA 94 liability and then multiply by 50%.17   
Actuaries calculate MDBP withdrawal liabilities using a company’s share of the 
unfunded MDBP liabilities.  Therefore, it is reasonable to first estimate a plan’s unfunded 
liabilities (liabilities minus assets) to estimate a company’s ongoing MDBP liability. 
Although the RPA 94 current liability has the advantage that it is a standard measure across 
companies, it uses Treasury bond interest rates to discount pension liabilities making the 
RPA 94 liabilities larger than liabilities discounted using corporate bond interest rates.  
MDBPs may invest in corporate bonds as well as treasury bonds to match their liabilities; 
therefore, reducing the RPA94 liability by multiplying by 90% better reflects a MDBP’s 
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liabilities.  Moody’s halved the MDBP unfunded liability (RPA 94 liability minus plan 
assets) to account for further pension benefit reductions  and wage concessions from labor 
after feedback from MDBP actuaries and other MDBP stakeholders.  In my calculations, I 
estimate a company’s ongoing MDBP liabilities rather than its withdrawal liability and 
follow Moody’s methodology by halving the MDBP unfunded liability to account for 
concessions from labor providing the best estimate of a MDBP’s ongoing unfunded 
liability.  I illustrate below how I calculate an individual MDBP’s unfunded liabilities 
denoted as ULMDBP: 
ULMDBP=0.9 x (L-A) x 0.5 
where L=RPA 94 Liability and A= Current Value of Net Assets 
I give a numerical example illustrating the calculation of a MDBP’s unfunded 
liability in Appendix A.1. 
I follow the methodology of Zion et al. (2012) and estimate an employer’s share of 
the MDBP unfunded liabilities by using the Form 5500 Schedule R’s employer’s plan year 
contributions divided by the total employer plan year contributions.  Company withdrawal 
liabilities can be calculated using either the unfunded vested benefits traceable to the 
company’s employees or allocating a company’s share of the MDBP’s unfunded liability 
using the company’s share of total plan contributions over a specified period (McMurdy, 
2009).  Data on a company’s traceable unfunded vested benefits are not available, and 
employer contributions data only became available from the 2009 plan year onwards. 
Therefore, given the data limitations, using the 2009 plan year employer contributions as a 






is a reasonable methodology to employ.  I use the schedule MB total employer 
contributions for the total employer contributions.  I use schedule H total contributions for 
the total employer contributions when schedule MB total employer contributions are 
missing.  When the plan’s total Schedule R employer contributions are greater than the 
total employer contributions, I use the schedule R total employer contributions to calculate 
the employer’s share of the MDBP liabilities. Otherwise I use the total employer 
contributions.  For the 2009 plan year, 12 out of 333 plans have schedule R total employer 
contributions greater than Schedule MB total employer contributions. 
I calculate a schedule R company A’s share of the MDBP unfunded liabilities 
denoted as ULA as follows: 
ULA= CA/TC x ULMDBP 
where CA =Company A’s Contributions and TC=Total Employer Contributions 
I give a numerical example showing the calculation of a company’s share of a 
MDBP’s unfunded liability in Appendix A.2. 
YRC Worldwide (YRC hereafter) temporarily suspended their contributions to a 
majority of their MDBPs beginning in the second half of 2009 and continuing throughout 
2010.  In order to calculate YRC’s MDBP liabilities, I assume that YRC’s recorded 2009 
Schedule R contributions represent 50% of YRC’s unsuspended annual contributions.  
Therefore, I double YRC’s Schedule R pension contributions for the 2009 plan year and I 
adjust the plan’s total employer contributions accordingly.  I do not replace 2009 plan year 
MDBP information listing YRC or its subsidiaries on Schedule R with the 2010 plan year 
MDBP information.  YRC contributed in aggregate $554.1 million to 20 multiemployer 






company’s monthly pension funding obligations (Fleet Owner, 2009).  Therefore, a 
reasonable estimate of YRC’s 2009 plan year unsuspended contribution to the Central 
States is $321 million (58% of $554.1 million).  After doubling YRC’s 2009 Schedule R 
contributions, I estimate that YRC makes a $276 million contribution to Central States; my 
estimate is similar in magnitude to the $321 million estimate from other sources. YRC’s 
contributions to Central States is 94% of its total 2009 Schedule R contributions. Therefore, 
doubling YRC’s 2009 Schedule R contribution in order to estimate YRC’s MDBP 
liabilities is a reasonable adjustment to account for YRC’s suspension of contributions to 
MDBPs in the second half of 2009. 
 
1.4.2 Calculation of LMS MDBP Liability Spillovers 
I define a firm’s LMS liability spillovers as the total liability spillovers from other 
Schedule R firms in the event that all other Schedule R firms file for bankruptcy. LMS 
MDBP liability spillovers are an extreme case and represent the maximum MDBP liability 
spillover onto a nonbankrupt company by other bankrupt Schedule R firms.  I calculate a 
firm’s LMS liability spillovers from both public and private firms.  In order to calculate 
LMS MDBP liability spillover, I make two assumptions:  In the event of bankruptcy, a 
company withdraws from a MDBP and the MDBP recovers none of its unsecured 
withdrawal liability claim and nonbankrupt MDBP companies inherit bankrupt companies’ 
MDBP liabilities in proportion to their share of total nonbankrupt company MDBP 
contributions.  I calculate LMS MDBP liability spillover in two stages: First I calculate a 
nonbankrupt firm A’s share of the bankrupt firm(s) MDBP liability denoted by SA by 





contributions and second I calculate the MDBP spillover onto the nonbankrupt company 
A denoted by SLMSA,-A by multiplying the nonbankrupt company’s share of the total 
MDBP spillover (i) by the bankrupt firm(s) MDBP liability. 
 
1.4.2.1 Calculating LMS MDBP Liability Spillovers With Two Public  
Schedule R Companies 
I calculate LMS MDBP liability spillovers with two public Schedule R companies 
as follows: 
SA = CA / (TC- CB)      SLMSA,-A = SA x ULB            .                                     
where SA is company A’s share of bankrupt company B’s MDBP liabilities   
where SLMSA,-A is the spillover of bankrupt company B’s MDBP liabilities onto company 
A  
 I give a numerical example illustrating how I calculate LMS MDBP liability spillovers 
with two Public Schedule R Companies in Appendix A.3. 
 
1.4.2.2 Calculating LMS MDBP Liability Spillovers With Three Public  
Schedule R Companies 
I calculate LMS MDBP liability spillovers with three public Schedule R companies 
as follows: 
SA =CA/ (TC- CB- CC)  
SLMSA,-A = SA x (ULB + ULC) 







spillovers with three public Schedule R companies in Appendix A.4. 
 
1.4.3 Calculation of Bankruptcy Probabilities 
In order to calculate a company’s 1-year expected MDBP liability spillovers, I first 
estimate each public company’s bankruptcy probabilities denoted as pi.  The Form 5500 
Schedule R companies are mostly subsidiaries of public parent companies; Kolasinski 
(2009) explains that a strong subisidary is generally rated no higher than its parent18 and 
industrial firms mostly file for bankruptcy with their subsidiaries.  Therefore, for the 
majority of MDBP firms, the parent public bankruptcy probability is most likely a lower 
bound on the subsidiary’s bankruptcy probability. 
I use Altman (1968) Z-scores to estimate bankruptcy probabilities. I chose to use 
Z-scores rather than Ohlson (1980) O-scores or probabilities based on the Black and 
Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) option-pricing model because Z-scores have the 
smallest number of missing values and my aim is to provide a comprehensive 
quantification of public companies expected MDBP liability spillovers.  When a company 
files for bankruptcy, I set its bankruptcy probability to one.  I follow Mansi, Maxwell, and  
Zhang (2013) and reverse the signs of the original Altman’s Z-score coefficients so that 
the Z-score is increasing in bankruptcy probability.  I follow Mansi et al. (2013) and 
calculate negative Altman Z-scores using the following model: 
 
   Negative Altman Z-score=-1.2*wcta-1.4*reta-3.3*ebitta-0.60*mvliab-0.999sata    (1.5) 
                                                          
18 Kolasinski gives two key reasons why subsidiaries are rated no higher than their parent:  (1) a weak 
financially distressed parent’s ability and incentive to take assets from and burden its subsidiaries with debt 





where wcta is working capital (current assets – current liabilities) scaled by total assets, 
reta is retained earnings scaled by total assets, mvliab is market value of equity divided by 
total liability, and sata is sales divided by total assets.   
I follow Hillgeist, Keating, and Lundstedt (2004) and convert the negative Altman 









                    (1.6) 
Hillgeist et al. (2004) point out that although this transformation is not strictly 
correct for the Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) estimated Z-score, McFadden 
(1976) shows that under normality assumptions the MDA and logit approaches are closely 
related. 
 
1.4.4. Calculation of 1-year Expected Public Company 
MDBP Liability Spillovers 
In order to calculate 1-year expected MDBP liability spillovers, I make the same 
four assumptions as I do in the LMS case. I calculate 1-year expected MDBP liability 
spillovers in two stages: 
1. I calculate the LMS MDBP liability spillover onto the nonbankrupt company 
denoted by SLMSA,-A. 
2. I calculate the expected MDBP spillover onto the nonbankrupt firm denoted by 






1.4.4.1 Calculating One-year Expected MDBP Liability Spillovers  
With Two Public Schedule R Companies 
                            SEXPA,-A =SLMSA,-A x pB x (1-pA)                                                   (1.7) 
where SEXPA,-A is the expected MDBP liability spillover of bankrupt company B onto 
company A  and where pA  is the probability that company A goes bankrupt in the next 
year. 
 
1.4.4.2 Calculating 1-year Expected MDBP Liability Spillovers  
With Three Public Schedule R Companies 
  SEXPA,B = SLMSA,B x pB x (1-pC) x (1-pA,) 
 SEXPA,C = SLMSA,C x pC x (1-pB) x (1-pA) 
                                       SEXPA,BC =SLMSA,B x pB x pC x (1-pA) 
    SEXPA,-A= SEXPA,B +SLMSA,C + SEXPA,BC    
where SEXPA,B is the expected MDBP liability spillover onto A when only B goes 
bankrupt, SEXPA,C is the expected MDBP liability spillover onto A when only C goes 
bankrupt, and SEXPA,BC is the expected MDBP liability spillover onto A when both B and 
C go bankrupt. 
 
1.4.5 Calculation of 5-Year Expected MDBP Public Company MDBP  
Liability Spillovers  
In order to calculate 5-year expected MDBP liability spillovers, I further assume that 
1-year bankruptcy probabilities remain constant over a 5-year period and assume a 5% 






calculate expected 5-year MDBP liability spillovers onto the nonbankrupt company in two 
stages: 
1. I calculate the LMS MDBP liability spillover onto the nonbankrupt company 
denoted by SLMSA,-A. 
2. I calculate the 5-year expected MDBP spillover onto the nonbankrupt firm denoted 
by S5EXPA,-A by multiplying the 5-year bankruptcy event probability by SLMSA,A. 
In the two public company case, there are five possible spillover events where 
company B’s MDBP liability spills onto company A.  I illustrate the five possible events 
in Table 1.1. 
I show how I calculate spillover probabilities, discounted MDBP liability 
spillovers, and discounted expected MDBP liability spillovers in Table 1.2.  I sum up five 
expected discounted MDBP liability spillovers to calculate the total 5-year expected 
MDBP liability spillover from company B onto company A. In the three Schedule R public 
company case, there are 35 possible spillover events where company B’s MDBP liability 
and/or company C’s MDBP liability spills onto company A.  I illustrate the 35 possible 
spillover events in Table 1.3.  In Figure 1.1, I show how I calculate spillover event 
probabilities, discounted MDBP liability spillovers, and discounted MDBP liability 
spillovers for the three Schedule R public company MDBP case using a numeric example. 
 
      1.5 Calculation of Leverage Ratios 
I examine the effect of MDBP liabilities and expected 1-year MDBP liability 
spillovers on MDBP public companies’ leverage ratios.  I calculate MDBP liabilities and 





of long-term debt. I follow the methodology of Shivdasani and Stefanescu (2010) to 
calculate three measures of leverage from the reported balance sheet.  I also report these 
three leverage measures with debt consolidated with MDBP liabilities and with debt 
consolidated with the sum of MDBP liabilities and expected MDBP liability spillovers.  I 
calculate Book D/A as the ratio of long-term debt plus the current portion of long-term debt 
to the book value of assets, Book D/D+E as the ratio of book long-term debt to the book 
value of equity plus the book value of long-term debt and Market D/A as the ratio of the 
book value of long-term debt to the market value of assets (book value of assets minus 
book value of equity plus the market value of equity). 
 
      1.6 Sample Selection 
For the 2009 plan year, there are 4,902 first filing observations associated with 
1,366 unique MDBPs.  I delete 10 observations from the Pennsylvania Heavy and Highway 
Contractors Pension Trust because there are three observations for each of the five 
Schedule R employers with the same total employer contribution but different 
contributions rates.19  I delete one observation because the public company’s MDBP 
contribution is a withdrawal payment. 
There are 1,389 observations, 333 unique MDBPs and 529 public company 
observations for MDBPs with at least one U.S. incorporated public company listed on 
Schedule R. In Table 1.4, I detail how I matched Schedule R companies to public 
companies. 
I lose 40 observations because I consolidate all public company observations in the 
                                                          






same MDBP into one public company MDBP observation.  My final 2009 plan year sample 
consists of 1,349 observations, 333 unique MDBPs and 489 public company observations 
associated with 154 unique public companies with 144 U.S. incorporated public 
companies.  In order to summarize 2009 plan year expected liability spillovers, I use 2010 
fiscal year Z-scores and Z probabilities. 
In order to examine expected spillover information disclosed to the market through 
Form 5500 filings through time, I calculate expected liability spillovers available from 
public Form 5500 information on a monthly basis.  I have 17 month end-dates starting at 
July 30, 2010, and ending on November 30, 2011.  I use the most recent publicly available 
Form 5500 information.  Consequently, I replace 189 2009 plan year MDBPs with their 
corresponding 2010 plan year MDBP.  Twenty-three MDBPs no longer list any 2009 plan 
year public companies on their 2010 plan year Schedule R.  I include 25 new 2010 plan 
year MDBPs which contain at least one Schedule R employer EIN associated with my 2009 
plan year public companies where the 2009 plan year public company was not previously 
listed on the MDBP’s 2009 plan year Schedule R. 
 
                1.7 Sample Description 
1.7.1 Plan Characteristics 
For the 2009 plan year, MDBP first filing dates range from June 4, 2010, to 
September 15, 2011, 54.1% of filing dates are between October 5, 2010, and October 22, 
2010.20 MDBP unfunded liabilities for 2009 plan year range from -$331.5 million to $12.1 
billion with a mean of $ 190.2 million and a median of $29.1 million. The distribution of 
                                                          
20 MDBP plans must file 7 months after the plan year end and may apply for a 2.5 month filing date 





plan unfunded liabilities is severely positively skewed (skew=11.1).  Two plans have 
unfunded liabilities larger than $7 billion,21 whereas 63.7% of plans have unfunded 
liabilities of less than $50 million.  In Figure 1.2, I plot a histogram of the distribution of 
plan unfunded liabilities. 
For an individual MDBP, the number of Schedule R companies ranges from 1 to 
18 with a mean and median of four companies. Schedule R does not list companies 
contributing 5% or less of the total plan year contributions.  I detail the distribution of the 
number of Schedule R public companies for an individual MDBP in Table 1.5.  For an 
individual MDBP, the number of Schedule R public companies ranges from 1 to 6 with a 
mean of 1.5 companies (median 1.0 company) whereas the number of Schedule R private 
companies ranges from one to 16 with a mean of 2.8 companies (median 2.0 companies).  
 
1.7.2 Public Company Characteristics 
In my final sample, there are 154 unique public MDBP companies, 144 of whom 
are incorporated in the U.S.  The 154 public companies appear on between 1 and 35 MDBP 
Schedule Rs with a mean of 3.2 Schedule Rs and a median of one Schedule R.  Table 1.6 
shows the distribution of the number of public companies appearing on MDBP Schedule 
Rs.  
In Table 1.7, I compare public MDBP company fiscal year 2010 summary statistics 
with those of Compustat companies listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX exchanges. 
On average, public MDBP companies are more than three times larger and have a 
                                                          
21 The Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Plan (Central States) has $12.1 billion in 






lower market to book ratio than Compustat public companies.  For fiscal year 2010, public 
MDBP companies have a mean market value of equity of $15.6 billion (median $3.6 
billion) with a mean market to book ratio of 3.7 (median 1.8) whereas public Compustat 
companies have a mean market value of equity of $5.0 billion (median $0.6 billion) with a 
mean market to book ratio of 5.7 (median 1.7).  MDBP companies’ median Z-probability 
is 7% whereas public Compustat companies’ median Z-probability is 4%.  In 2011, 88 
public equity or public debt companies filed for bankruptcy compared to 106 public 
companies in 2010 and 211 public companies in 2009 (Hamiton 2012).  In 2011, there were 
9,291 public equity or public debt companies with a 0.95% bankruptcy rate. 
 
1.7.3 Company Individual MDBP Liabilities  
Company individual MDBP liabilities may be negative when a plan’s net assets 
exceed the plan’s liabilities.  Company individual MDBP liabilities range from -$44.9 
million to $4.4 billion (YRC Worldwide’s share of the Central State’s unfunded liability) 
and are extremely skewed, the mean MDBP Schedule R company liability is $23.9 million 
with a median of $2.6 million. In Figure 1.3, I plot a histogram of individual MDBP 
company liabilities.  Schedule R employer contributions cover on average 61.9% (median 
63.9%) of total MDBP employer contributions.  Public company schedule R contributions 
cover on average 29.9% (median 19.9%) of the total MDBP employer contributions and 
private company schedule R contributions cover on average 32.0% (median 30.5%) of total 







1.7.4 Public Company Total MDBP Liabilities for the 2009 Plan Year 
I sum public company MDBP liabilities across plans.  The total  2009 plan year 
MDBP public company liability ranges from -$30.4 million to $6.2 billion (United Parcel 
Service Inc.), with a mean total public company liability of $155.3 million (median of $10.2 
million).  The distribution of public company total MDBP liabilities is severely positively 
skewed (skew=7.0).  Six companies have total MDBP liabilities of more than $1 billion 
whereas 76 companies have total MDBP liabilities of less than $10 million.  Using 2010 
fiscal year22 COMPUSTAT market values and total assets, I find that the mean total public 
company MDBP unfunded liability as a percentage of book assets is 3.5% (median 0.2%) 
whereas the mean total public unfunded SDBP liability as a percentage of book assets is 
2.8% (median 1.2%).23  The mean total public company MDBP liability as a percentage of 
market value of equity is 37.1% 24(median 0.3%).  For the 2009 plan year, the aggregate 
public company MDBP unfunded liability was $23.9 billion while the aggregate public 
company SDBP unfunded liability of 1,366 companies was $454.6 billion.  In Table 1.8, I 
present summary statistics for total public company MDBP liabilities by broad industry 
group.  Transportation industry companies account for over one half (51.8%) of these 
aggregate liabilities, three companies account for 96% of aggregate transportation MDBP 
liabilities: UPS with $6.2 billion, YRC Worldwide with $4.6 billion, and Arkansas Best 
with $1.1 billion.  Food/Retail companies account for 29.0% of aggregate MDBP liabilities; 
                                                          
22 I use 2010 fiscal year total assets and market value of equity because 2009 plan years end from 
December 31, 2009, until November 30, 2010 and 2009 plans file from June 2010 until September 2011. 
23 I define public company as a company that has shares traded on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ 
exchanges.  Using Compustat data, I follow Stefanescu and Shivdasani (2010) and calculate SDBP 
unfunded liability as (pbpro +pbpru)-(pplao+pplau). 
24 Three companies have MDBP liabilities bigger than their market value of equity: YRC Worldwide 
(2,591%), Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company (2,361%) and Arkansas Best (165%) leading to a large 





three companies account for 83% of aggregate food/retail liabilities: Safeway with $2.6 
billion, Kroger with $2.0 billion, and Supervalu with $1.2 billion.  The four mines/coal/oil 
companies account for 5.6% of aggregate liabilities; all four companies have MDBP 
liabilities greater than 3% of their market value of equity. 
In Table 1.9, I list the 22 public companies with unfunded MDBP liabilities 
exceeding $120 million together with the company’s MDBP liability characteristics.  
MDBP liabilities are significant in terms of book assets in 28% of MDBP public 
companies.  Forty-four companies have total public company MDBP liabilities exceeding 
1% of their book assets; for these 44 companies, the median total public company MDBP 
liability as a percentage of book assets is 3.3% and the median total public company MDBP 
liability as a percentage of market equity is 4.9%.  
Sixteen companies have total public company MDBP liabilities bigger than 5% of 
their book assets; for these 16 companies, the median total public company MDBP liability 
as a percentage of book assets is 9.6% and the median total public company MDBP liability 
as a percentage of market value of equity is 14.7%.  
Eight companies have total public company MDBP liabilities bigger than 10% of 
their book assets; for these eight companies, the median total public company MDBP 
liability as a percentage of book assets is 16.5% and the median total public company 
MDBP liability as a percentage of market value of equity is 23.0%.  Three companies have 
MDBP liabilities bigger than their market value of equity: YRC Worldwide (2,591%), 
Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company (2,361%), 25and Arkansas Best (165%).  Seventy 
of the 144 U.S. incorporated companies disclose in their 10-Ks their total MDBP 
                                                          
25 Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company was a distressed company; its market value of equity at the end 





contributions with a mean total contribution of $56.4 million (median $15.2 million); on 
average, total Schedule R contributions account for 74.3%26 (median 60.6%) of these 70 
companies total annual MDBP contributions.  In Table 1.10, I present leverage ratios for 
nonfinancial and nonutility MDBP companies and Compustat companies with no missing 
leverage information and positive book equity.  MDBP public companies are more levered 
then Compustat companies; MDBP public companies’ mean leverage ratios are about 40% 
higher than those of Compustat companies.  For MDBP companies, Book D/A increases 
from a mean of 0.84 (median 0.83) to 0.87 (median 0.84) once unfunded MDBP liabilities 
are consolidated, Market D/A increases from a mean of 0.46 (median 0.46) to 0.48 (median 
0.47) once unfunded MDBP liabilities are consolidated and Book D/ (D+E) increases from 
a mean of 0.61 (median 0.59) to 0.63 (median 0.60) once unfunded MDBP liabilities are 
consolidated.  In sum, leverage ratios rise on average by about 4% once unfunded MDBP 
liabilities are consolidated. 
 
1.7.5 Public Companies’ LMS MDBP Liability Spillovers  
for the 2009 Plan Year 
Public companies must belong to at least one MDBP with two or more Schedule R 
companies in order to be exposed to LMS liability spillovers; in my sample, 151 public 
companies are exposed to LMS MDBP liability spillovers; the mean number of MDBPs 
exposing these 151 companies to LMS MDBP liability spillover risks is 3.0 plans (median 
one plan).  There are 304 MDBPs exposing public companies to LMS liability spillovers 
                                                          
26 Eleven companies’ total 2009 plan year Schedule R contributions are bigger than their 10-K total MDBP 
contributions, for the remaining 59 companies the mean total Schedule R contributions account for 48.5% 






from both private and public companies.  LMS liability spillovers from both private and 
public companies range from -$37.2 million to $2.65 billion (Safeway) with a mean of 
$88.4 million (median $6.4 million).  LMS MDBP liability spillover is severely skewed 
(skew=6.1).  Eighteen companies have LMS MDBP liability spillovers larger than $100 
million and 37 companies have LMS MDBP liability spillovers smaller than $1 million. 
LMS MDBP liability spillovers as a percentage of book assets range from -0.2% to 
92.6% (Arkansas Best) with a mean of 2.1% (median 0.2%).  LMS MDBP liability 
spillover as a percentage of book assets is severely skewed (skew=9.0).  Eight companies 
have LMS MDBP liability spillovers larger than 10% of their book assets and 76 
companies have LMS MDBP liability spillovers smaller than 0.1% of their book assets.  
Ten companies have LMS MDBP liability spillovers larger than 10% of their market value 
of equity and 63 companies have LMS MDBP liability spillovers smaller than 0.1% of 
their market value of equity.  
I split the LMS MDBP liability spillovers into liability spillovers from public and 
private companies.  For the 87 companies that have both positive public and private LMS 
MDBP liability spillovers, on average, MDBP LMS liabilities from other public companies 
account for 35.1% (median 29.3%) of public and private LMS MDBP liabilities.   
For the 103 public companies with LMS MDBP liability spillovers from other 
public firms, the mean LMS MDBP liability spillover from other public firms is $63.6 
million (median $3.0 million).  Public LMS MDBP liability spillover is skewed 
(skew=4.3).  Twelve companies have LMS public MDBP liability spillovers larger than 
$100 million and 33 companies have LMS public MDBP liability spillovers smaller than 





of 1.8% (median 0.0%).  LMS public MDBP liability spillover as a percentage of book 
assets is severely skewed (skew=8.9).  Three companies have LMS public MDBP liability 
spillovers as a percentage of book assets larger than 10% and 66 companies have LMS 
public MDBP liability spillovers as a percentage of book assets smaller than 0.1%.   
One-hundred-and-thirty-nine public companies have LMS MDBP liability 
spillovers from private companies with a mean private LMS MDBP liability spillover of 
$48.9 million (median $5.0 million).  Private LMS MDBP liability spillover is skewed 
(skew=6.4).  Eleven companies have LMS private MDBP liability spillovers larger than 
$100 million and 31 companies have LMS private MDBP liability spillovers smaller than 
$1 million. LMS private MDBP liability spillover as a percentage of book assets has a 
mean of 1% (median 0.1%).  LMS private MDBP liability spillover as a percentage of book 
assets is skewed (skew=3.5).  Three companies have private LMS MDBP liability 
spillovers as a percentage of market equity larger than 10% and 75 companies have LMS 
MDBP liability spillovers as a percentage of market equity smaller than 0.1%.   
 
1.7.6 Public Companies’ Expected MDBP Liability Spillovers  
for the 2009 Plan Year 
Public companies must belong to at least one MDBP with two or more Schedule R 
public companies in order to be exposed to expected public company liability spillovers; 
in my sample, 103 public companies are exposed to expected MDBP public company 
spillovers; of these 103 companies, the mean number of MDBPs exposing them to public 
company liability spillover risks is 2.6 plans (median one plan).  In Table 1.11, I present 





spillovers from other public companies. In order to calculate expected public company 
liability spillover risks for an individual plan, all public companies in the plan must have 
nonmissing Z-scores.  I use 2010 fiscal year Z-scores to calculate 2009 plan year expected 
MDBP liability spillovers.  I present a histogram of my sample’s negative Altman Z-scores 
in Figure 1.4. 
There are 115 MDBPs exposing public companies to liability spillovers from other 
public companies; 19 of these MDBPs have missing expected MDBP liability spillovers 
due to missing Z-scores.  For the 2009 plan year, 28 of the 103 liability spillover risk 
exposed companies have at least one MDBP where the public company liability spillover 
risk is missing due to at least one missing Z-score.  For the remaining 75 companies, the 
1-year expected MDBP liability spillover ranges from $0.0 million to $194.5 million 
(Arkansas Best27), with a mean of $5.3 million (median $0.3 million).  One-year expected 
MDBP liability spillover is severely skewed (skew=7.8).  Thirteen companies have 1-year 
expected liability spillovers of more than $5 million and 51 companies have 1-year 
expected MDBP liability spillovers of less than $0.1 million. For the 23 companies whose 
expected 1-year MDBP liability spillovers exceed $1 million, the mean expected MDBP 
liability spillover is $17.6 million (median $8.2 million).  The mean expected MDBP 
liability spillovers as a percentage of total assets is 1.2% (median 0.1%) and the mean 
expected MDBP liability spillovers as a percentage of market value of equity is 4.6% 
(median 0.2%). In Table 1.12, I tabulate the 23 companies with 1-year expected MDBP 
liability spillovers greater than $1 million.   
For the 75 companies with no missing Z-scores, the mean LMS MDBP liability 
                                                          
27 $179.3 million of Arkansas Best’s expected liability spillover is from YRC Worldwide in the Central 





spillover is 22.5 times greater than the mean 1-year expected MDBP liability spillover.  
The mean LMS MDBP liability spillover as a percentage of book assets is 9.6 times greater 
than the mean 1-year expected MDBP liability spillover as a percentage of book assets.  I 
compare LMS MDBP liabilities with 1-year expected MDBP liabilities in Table 1.13.  The 
LMS MDBP liability spillover is a worst-case scenario because it assumes that all other 
public and private Schedule R companies go bankrupt.  In contrast, the 1-year expected 
MDBP liability spillover only considers liability spillovers from public MDBP companies 
and assumes that public Schedule R companies’ bankruptcy probabilities are independent.  
MDBP company bankruptcy probabilities are most likely correlated because most often 
MDBP sharing companies are in the same industry.  Therefore, the actual 1-year expected 
MDBP liability spillover lies somewhere between my calculated expected 1-year MDBP 
liability spillover and my calculated LMS liability spillover.  I calculate 5-year expected 
MDBP liability spillovers for plans with two or three public companies using a 5% discount 
rate.  Two-hundred-and-nine of the 218 nonmissing MDBP expected liability spillovers 
observations are associated with plans with two or three public companies.  On average, a 
company’s 5-year expected MDBP liability spillovers is 2.6 times its 1-year expected 
MDBP liability spillovers.  There are 66 firms with no missing expected MDBP liability 
spillovers and belonging only to plans with less than four public companies.  For these 66 
companies, the mean 5-year expected MDBP liability spillover is $10.1 million, 2.4 times 
the mean 1-year expected MDBP liability spillovers, bigger than 0.1% of their book assets  
For the 75 companies with no missing expected MDBP liability spillovers, 1-year 
expected MDBP liability spillovers as a percentage of total assets range from 0.0% to 





as a percentage of market value of equity range from 0.0% to 69.6% with a mean of 1.4% 
(median 0.0%).  For the 66 companies belonging exclusively to plans with less than 4 
public firms, the mean 5-year expected MDBP liability spillover as a percentage of book 
assets is 0.8%, 2.1 times the mean 1-year expected MDBP liability spillover as a percentage 
of book assets.  In Table 1.14, I present summary statistics for 1-year and 5-year expected 
MDBP liability spillovers. 
In Table 1.15, I present expected MDBP liability spillover summary statistics by 
broad industry group for companies with no missing expected MDBP spillovers.  
Transportation has the largest mean expected MDBP liability spillover of $29.4 million 
(median $5.6 million) followed by mines/coal/oil with a mean of $18.6 million (median 
$19.1 million).   
In Table 1.16, I present reported leverage ratios and leverage ratios consolidated 
with MDBP liabilities and expected MDBP liability spillovers for nonutility and 
nonfinancial MDBP companies with no missing plan expected MDBP spillovers, no 
missing leverage information, and positive book equity.  For these 69 companies, Book 
D/A increases from a mean of 0.84 (median 0.82) to 0.88 (median 0.85) once unfunded 
MDBP liabilities and expected MDBP liability spillovers are consolidated, Market D/A 
increases from a mean of 0.47 (median 0.46) to 0.50 (median 0.48) once unfunded MDBP 
liabilities and expected MDBP liability spillovers are consolidated and Book D/(D+E) 
increases from a mean of 0.62 (median 0.60) to 0.66 (median 0.63) once unfunded MDBP 
liabilities and expected MDBP liability spillovers are consolidated.  In sum, leverage ratios 
rise on average by about 6% once unfunded MDBP liabilities and expected MDBP liability 





Fifteen public companies have 1-year expected MDBP liability spillovers bigger 
than 0.1% of their book assets; for these 15 companies, the mean 1-year expected MDBP 
liability spillovers as a percentage of book assets are 1.8% (median 0.2%).  Two companies 
have 1-year expected MDBP liability spillovers larger than 1% of book assets, Arkansas 
Best (22.6%) and Walter Energy (1.7%).  Five companies have 5-year expected MDBP 
liability spillovers bigger than 1% of book assets; for these, mean 5-year expected MDBP 
liability spillover as a percentage of total assets is 10.0% (median 0.7%). 
It is important to remember that MDBPs expose public companies to potential 
MDBP liability spillovers from both private companies and non-Schedule R public 
companies.  In my sample, on average, other public Schedule R companies’ liabilities 
account for just 16.3% (median 7.4%) of the total MDBP liabilities that can spill over onto 
public companies from all other MDBP companies.  Kroger disclosed that it contributed 
$7.0 million and Kelloggs disclosed that it contributed $3.6 million to the Central States in 
200928  in their 2011 10-Ks but Kroger and Kelloggs do not appear on the 2009 Central 
States’ Schedule R because their contributions are dwarfed by those of YRC Worldwide 
and Arkansas Best.  Therefore, in my sample, calculated MDBP expected liability 
spillovers are most likely a small percentage of public companies’ total expected MDBP 
liability spillovers from all MDBP sharing companies.  On the other hand, my calculated 
MDBP expected liability spillovers do not account for positive competitive effects.  I 
calculate that the expected liability spillover from Supervalu onto Kroger is $11 million.29  
 
                                                          
28 Kroger and Kelloggs both deemed the Central States one of their significant MDBPs and disclosed this 
information in accordance with ASU 2011-09. 





1.8 Form 5500’s Revelation of Expected MDBP Liability Spillovers to  
                                          Market Participants 
In order to document expected MDBP liability spillovers available to market 
participants from publicly available Form 5500 MDBP liability spillover information, I 
calculate expected MDBP liability spillovers on a monthly basis from July 30, 2010, to  
November 30, 2011.  In Figure 1.5, I plot a graph of the aggregate expected MDBP 
spillovers revealed to market participants by Form 5500 filings.  In Figure 1.6, I plot the 
aggregate MDBP spillovers revealed to the market by the four largest aggregate expected 
MDBP liability spillovers industry groups and in Table 1.17, I tabulate expected MDBP 
liability spillover summary statistics available to the market from Form 5500 filings on a 
monthly basis.  Aggregate expected MDBP liability spillovers revealed to the market by 
Form 5500 filings peaked at the end of April 2011 at $558.0 million, the transportation 
sector accounted for nearly one half (48.1%) of the expected MDBP liability spillovers, 
food/retail sector for one third (33.8%) of the expected MDBP liability spillovers, and 
mines/coal/oil sector for 11.7% of the expected liability spillovers.  LMS MDBP liability 
spillovers exist primarily between companies in the same broad industry group.  In Figure 
1.7, I illustrate the sources of LMS MDBP liability spillover risks for companies in the 
transportation and aircraft industry.  In Figure 1.8, I illustrate the sources of LMS MDBP 
spillover risks for companies in the food/retail/drugs industry.  In Figure 1.9, I illustrate 
the sources of LMS MDBP liability spillover risks for companies in mines/coal/oil 
industry.  In Figure 1.10, I illustrate the sources of LMS MDBP liability spillover risks for 
companies in the construction/engineering/steel industry. 





broad industry group.  At the end of April 2011, on average, 95.3% of expected spillover 
risks onto public companies were due to companies within the same broad industry group.  
In Figure 1.11, I illustrate the sources of expected MDBP liability spillover risks for 
companies in the transportation and aircraft industry.  In Figure 1.12, I illustrate the sources 
of expected MDBP liability spillover risks for companies in the food/retail/drugs industry.  
In Figure 1.13, I illustrate the sources of expected MDBP liability spillover risks for 
companies in the mines/coal/oil industry.  In Figure 1.14, I illustrate the sources of expected 
MDBP liability spillover risks for companies in the construction/engineering/steel 
industry. 
                        
                       1.9 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I document the size and relevance of public companies’ Schedule 
R MDBP liabilities, LMS, and expected MDBP liability spillovers from other Schedule 
R public companies.  I also study the effect on public MDBP companies’ leverage ratios 
of consolidating unfunded MDBP Schedule R liabilities and expected 1-year MDBP 
liability spillovers with reported debt.  I document important expected liability spillovers 
in four different industries and show that MDBPs create important connections in U.S. 
unionized industries. 
I find 154 public companies (144 incorporated in the U.S) listed on 2009 Schedule 
R Form 5500 filings.  On average, MDBP public companies are three times bigger and 
40% more leveraged than Compustat non-MDBP public companies.  In aggregate, the 154 
public companies are responsible for $23.9 billion MDBP liabilities with a mean company 





companies’ total MDBP liabilities is severely positively skewed; six companies have total 
MDBP liabilities of more than $1 billion.  Forty-four (28%) of  public companies have 
total MDBP liabilities bigger than 1% of their book assets, nine public companies have 
total MDBP liabilities outstripping 10% of their market value of equity, and three 
companies have total MDBP liabilities exceeding the market value of their equity. 
Three industries are responsible for 86% of aggregate MDBP liabilities: 
transportation (51.8%), food/retail (29%), and mines/coal/oil (5.6%). Aggregate 
transportation industry MDBP liabilities are $12.4 billion; three companies account for 
96% of these liabilities: UPS with $6.2 billion, YRC Worldwide with $4.6 billion, and 
Arkansas Best with $1.1 billion.  Aggregate food/retail MDBP liabilities are $6.9 billion; 
three companies account for 83% of these liabilities: Safeway with $2.6 billion, Kroger 
with $2.0 billion, and Supervalu with $1.2 billion.  Aggregate mines/coal/oil industry 
MDBP liabilities are $1.3 billion; all four mines/coal/oil companies have MDBP liabilities 
exceeding 3% of their market value of equity. 
For the 2009 plan year, the mean public company total 1-year expected MDBP 
liability spillover is $5.3 million30 (median $0.3 million).  The distribution of 1-year 
expected MDBP liability spillovers is severely positively skewed; 13 companies have 1-
year expected liability spillovers of more than $5 million and 51 companies have expected 
MDBP liability spillovers of less than $0.1 million.  Five companies have 5-year expected 
MDBP liability spillovers exceeding 1% of book assets.  On average, a firm’s 5-year 
expected MDBP liability spillover is 2.6 times greater than its 1-year expected MDBP 
liability spillover. 
                                                          





Aggregate expected 1-year MDBP liability spillovers revealed to the market by 
Form 5500 filings peaked at the end of April 2011 at $558.0 million, the 1-year expected 
MDBP liability spillover from YRC Worldwide onto Arkansas Best accounted for 39% of 
the aggregate 1-year expected MDBP liability spillover, the food/retail sector for one third 
(33.8%) of the aggregate 1-year MDBP liability expected spillover, and the mines/coal/oil 
sector for 11.7% of the aggregate 1-year MDBP liability expected spillover. 
Book D/A increases from a mean of 0.84 (median 0.83) to 0.87 (median 0.84) once 
unfunded MDBP liabilities are consolidated with reported debt.  On average, leverage 
ratios increase by 4% once unfunded MDBP liabilities are consolidated with reported debt.  
Book D/A increases from a mean of 0.84 (median 0.82) to 0.88 (median 0.85) once 
unfunded MDBP liabilities and 1-year expected MDBP liability spillovers are consolidated 
with reported debt.  On average, leverage ratios increase by 6% once unfunded MDBP 




Table 1.1 Illustration of the Five Spillover Events in the 5-Year Two Public Company Case  
 
 




1 2 3 4 5 Description 
B     
B goes bankrupt in 1st year 
and A survives for 5 years 
 B    
B goes bankrupt in 2nd year 
and A survives for 5 years 
  B   
B goes bankrupt in 3rd year 
and A survives for 5 years 
   B  
B goes bankrupt in 4th year 
and A survives for 5 years 
    B 
B goes bankrupt in 5th year 






















Table 1.2. Calculation of Discounted Expected 5-Year Spillovers 
where r = 1-year discount rate and SLMSA,B,1 is the LMS MDBP spillover onto A when B goes bankrupt in the first year 
 
Bankrupt Company     Discounted 
Year Event Discounted Expected 
1 2 3 4 5 Probability  Spillover ($m)  Spillover ($m) 
B     PE1=(1-pA)5 x pB SLMSA,B,1 PE1 x SLMSA,B,1  
 B    PE2= (1-pA)5 x (1-pB) x pB SLMSA,B,2/(1+r) PE2 x SLMSA,B,2/(1+r) 
  B   PE3=(1-pA)5 x (1-pB)2 x pB SLMSA,B,,3//(1+r)2 PE3 x SLMSA,B,,3/(1+r)2 
   B  PE4=(1-pA)5 x (1-pB)3 x pB SLMSA,B,,3/(1+r)3 PE4 x SLMSA,B,,3 /(1+r)3 















Table 1.3. Three Public Company Spillover Events Over a 5-Year Period 
 
Bankruptcy Event   
Year Spillover Event Description 
1 2 3 4 5   
B     B goes bankrupt in the 1st year and A and C survive for 5 years 
C     C goes bankrupt in the 1st year and A and B survive for 5 years 
BC     B and C go bankrupt in the 1st year and A  survives for 5 years 
 B    B goes bankrupt in the 2nd  year and A and C survive for 5 years 
 C    C goes bankrupt in the 2nd year and A and B survive for 5 years 
 BC    B and C go bankrupt in the 2nd year and A  survives for 5 years 
B C    
B goes bankrupt in the 1st year, C goes bankrupt in the 2nd year and A 
survives for 5 years 
C B    
C goes bankrupt in the 1st year, B goes bankrupt in the 2nd year and A 
survives for 5 years 
  B   B goes bankrupt in the 3rd  year and A and C survive for 5 years 
  C   C goes bankrupt in the 3rd year and A and B survive for 5 years 
  BC   B and C go bankrupt in the 3rd year and A  survives for 5 years 
 B C   
B goes bankrupt in the 2nd year, C goes bankrupt in the 3rd year and A 
survives for 5 years 
 C B   
C goes bankrupt in the 2nd year, B goes bankrupt in the 3rd year and A 
survives for 5 years 
B   C   
B goes bankrupt in the 1st year, C goes bankrupt in the 3rd year and A 
survives for 5 years 
C   B   
C goes bankrupt in the 1st year, B goes bankrupt in the 3rd year and A 
survives for 5 years 
   B  B goes bankrupt in the 4th  year and A and C survive for 5 years 
   C  C goes bankrupt in the 4th year and A and B survive for 5 years 
   BC  B and C go bankrupt in the 3rd year and A  survives for 5 years 
  B C  
B goes bankrupt in the 3rd year, C goes bankrupt in the 4th year and A 
survives for 5 years 
  C B  
C goes bankrupt in the 3rd year, B goes bankrupt in the 4th year and A 
survives for 5 years 
 B   C  
B goes bankrupt in the 2nd year, C goes bankrupt in the 4th year and A 
survives for 5 years 
 C   B  
C goes bankrupt in the 2nd year, B goes bankrupt in the 4th year and A 
survives for 5 years 
B     C  
B goes bankrupt in the 1st year, C goes bankrupt in the 4th year and A 
survives for 5 years 
C     B  
C goes bankrupt in the 1st year, B goes bankrupt in the 4th year and A 
survives for 5 years 
    B B goes bankrupt in the 5th  year and A and C survive for 5 years 
    C C goes bankrupt in the 5th year and A and B survive for 5 years 







Table 1.3. Continued 
 
Bankruptcy Event   
Year Spillover Event Description 
1 2 3 4 5   
   B C 
B goes bankrupt in the 4th year, C goes bankrupt in the 5th year and A 
survives for 5 years 
   C B 
C goes bankrupt in the 4th year, B goes bankrupt in the 5th year and A 
survives for 5 years 
  B   C 
B goes bankrupt in the 3rd year, C goes bankrupt in the 5th year and A 
survives for 5 years 
  C   B 
C goes bankrupt in the 3rd year, B goes bankrupt in the 4th year and A 
survives for 5 years 
 B     C 
B goes bankrupt in the 2nd year, C goes bankrupt in the 5th year and A 
survives for 5 years 
 C     B 
C goes bankrupt in the 2nd year, B goes bankrupt in the 5th year and A 
survives for 5 years 
B       C 
B goes bankrupt in the 1st year, C goes bankrupt in the 5th year and A 
survives for 5 years 
C       B 
C goes bankrupt in the 1st year, B goes bankrupt in the 5th year and A 




Table 1.4 Schedule R Company Matches to Public Companies 
Matching Method Number of 
observations 
Employer EIN 85 
Exhibit  21 202 
10-K 32 
Company website 42 
Same Employer EIN as 401K of Public 
Company 
28 




(court documents, news stories,  EIN 













Table 1.5 Distribution of Number of Companies Listed on an Individual MDBP’s 








1 29 8.7 
2 44 13.2 
3 63 18.9 
4 63 18.9 
5 60 18.0 
6 48 14.4 
7 18 5.4 
8 4 1.2 
9 3 0.9 
18 1 0.3 







Table 1.6 Distribution of Number of Public Companies Listed on an Individual 
MDBP’s Schedule R 
 




1 218 65.5 
2 82 24.6 
3 29 8.7 
4 1 0.3 
5 2 0.6 
6 1 0.3 







Table 1.7 Public MDBP Company Summary Statistics 
  
Panel A Descriptive Statistics      
  
MDBP Public 
Companies   
Non-MDBP Public 
Companies 
  141 observations   4,429 observations 
 Mean Median  Mean Median 
Market  Value of Equity  
 ($ millions) 15,568 3,601  5,002 563 
Log of book assets 8.6 8.6  6.9 6.6 
Market to Book Ratio 3.7 1.8  5.7 1.7 
  
131 
observations   3,271 observations 
 Mean Median  Mean Median 
Negative Altman Z-score -3.01 -2.66  -5.10 -3.11 
Z -Probability 0.10 0.07  0.14 0.04 
  
 
Panel B : Broad Industry Groups   
Broad Industry Group 




Aircraft 5 3.2 
Construction/Engineering/Steel 27 17.5 
Entertainment/Printing 20 13.0 
Food/Retail 27 17.5 
Hotels/Casinos 2 1.3 
Mines/Coal/Oil 4 2.6 
Paper/Paperboard 4 2.6 
Transportation 13 8.4 
Waste Management 6 3.9 
Other 46 29.9 







Table 1.8 Total Public Company Liability Summary Statistics by Broad Industry Group 
 





Broad Industry Group N Mean Median    Sum Total (%) 
Aircraft 5 96.4 14.4 482.1 2.0 
Construction/Engineering/Steel 27 31.5 2.9 851.3 3.6 
Entertainment/Printing 20 48.3 15.5 965.6 4.0 
Food/Retail 27 257.1 19.4 6,942.9 29.0 
Hotels/Casinos 2 7.5 7.5 15 0.1 
Mines/Coal/Oil 4 330.7 265.4 1,332.8 5.6 
Paper/Paperboard 4 27.6 24.6 110.5 0.5 
Transportation 13 953.4 71.8 12,394.4 51.8 
Waste Management 6 22.8 19.4 136.6 0.6 
Other 46 15.1 6.4 696 2.9 




Table p1.7 Public Companies with MDBP Liabilities exceeding $100 million for the 2009 
 
Ta






























Assets (%)  
UNITED PARCEL 
SERVICE 6,194.8 71,645 33,597 23 8.6 18.4 
YRC WORLDWIDE 4,584.4 177 2,593 9 2,591.1 176.8 
SAFEWAY 2,554.4 8,276 15,148 16 30.9 16.9 
KROGER  2,003.1 13,268 23,505 19 15.1 8.5 
SUPERVALU  1,189.6 1,830 13,758 21 65.0 8.6 
ARKANSAS BEST  1,145.1 693 861 8 165.3 133.0 
CONSOL ENERGY 652.5 11,023 12,071 1 5.9 5.4 
GREAT ATLANTIC and 
PACIFIC TEA  317.7 13 2,645 10 2,360.8 12.0 
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES  310.3 72,522 58,493 1 0.4 0.5 
DISNEY (WALT) 309.4 62,787 69,206 15 0.5 0.4 
EMCOR GROUP 276.9 1932 2,756 35 14.3 10.0 
NEWS CORP 267.3   9   
WALTER ENERGY 266.3 6,793 1,658 1 3.9 16.1 
ALPHA NATURAL 
RESOURCES 264.5 7,233 5,179 1 3.7 5.1 
KRAFT FOODS  247.1  21,598 2  1.1 
HILLSHIRE BRANDS  240.7 9,336 8,836 5 2.6 2.7 
UNITED CONTINENTAL  164.8 7,811 39,598 1 2.1 0.4 
SPIRIT AEROSYSTEMS  155.0 2,957 5,102 1 5.2 3.0 
BABCOCK and WILCOX  146.7 2,991 2,501 1 4.9 5.9 
PATRIOT COAL  139.4 1,762 3,810 1 7.9 3.7 
US STEEL  130.4 8,393 15,350 1 1.6 0.8 




Table 1.10 Leverage Characteristics of MDBP Companies and Non-MDBP Companies 
 
 MDBP  Non-MDBP 
 Companies  Companies 
 131 Companies  3,369 Companies 
 Mean Median  Mean Median 
MDBP liability as a percentage  
of Long Term Debt (%) 4.91 0.39    
Book D/A 0.84 0.83  0.66 0.65 
Book D/A consolidated 
 with MDBP Liability 0.87 0.84    
Market D/A 0.46 0.46  0.30 0.27 
Market D/A consolidated  
with MDBP Liability 0.48 0.47    
Book D/(D+E) 0.61 0.59  0.44 0.44 
Book D/(D+E) consolidated  
with MDBP Liability 0.63 0.60    
Market Value of Equity ($ millions) 13,329 3,213  5,121 591 
Log of Total Book Assets  8.5 8.5  6.3 6.2 







Table 1.11 Distribution of the Number of MDBPs Exposing Public Companies to Public 







0 51 33.1 
1 58 37.7 
2 17 11.0 
3 9 5.8 
4 3 1.9 
5 3 1.9 
6 1 0.6 
7 5 3.2 
8 1 0.6 
10 1 0.6 
11 1 0.6 
12 1 0.3 
14 2 1.3 
15 1 0.6 
Total 154 100 
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 Table 1.12 Schedule R Public Companies with 1-Year Expected MDBP Liability Spillovers Exceeding One Million Dollars 


















Company Name  ($ millions) 
ARKANSAS BEST  194.5 861 7 0 22.6 
WALTER ENERGY 28.1 1,658 1 0 1.7 
KROGER  24.7 23,505 15 0 0.1 
ALPHA NATURAL RESOURCES  24.7 5,179 1 0 0.5 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE  17.2 33,597 7 0 0.1 
SAFEWAY 15.9 15,148 14 1 0.1 
SUPERVALU  14.9 13,758 14 0 0.1 
CONSOL ENERGY 13.5 12,071 1 0 0.1 
SPIRIT AEROSYSTEMS 10.7 5,102 1 0 0.2 
GREAT ATLANTIC and PACIFIC TEA 9.4 2,645 7 0 0.4 
YRC WORLDWIDE  8.2 2,593 7 0 0.3 
PATRIOT COAL CORP 8.2 3,810 1 0 0.2 
US AIRWAYS GROUP  6.4 7,819 1 0 0.1 
UNITED CONTINENTAL  4.7 39,598 1 0 0.0 
UNITED STATES STEEL 3.8 15,350 1 0 0.0 
DELTA AIR LINES 3.7 43,188 1 0 0.0 
ARCELORMITTAL SA 3.5 130,904 1 0 0.0 
SYSCO CORP 3.0 10,314 3 0 0.0 
WYNN RESORTS 2.9 6,674 1 0 0.0 
STEINWAY MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS 1.8 485 1 0 0.4 
DISNEY (WALT)  1.8 69,206 10 4 0.0 
WASTE MANAGEMENT  1.5 21,476 3 0 0.0 





Table 1.13 LMS and 1-Year Expected Liability MDBP Spillovers 
 
     Spillover as a 
  Spillover in $millions Percentage of Book Assets 
 N Mean Median Maximum Mean Median Maximum 
LMS Spillover 75 119.2 17.2 2,223.5 3.3 0.2 92.6 
One-year Expected 
Spillover 75 5.3 0.3 194.5 0.4 0.0 22.6 
 
 
Table 1.14 One-Year and 5-Year Expected Liability MDBP Spillovers 
     
Spillover as a 
Percentage of Book Assets 
  Spillover in $millions 
 N Mean Median Maximum Mean Median Maximum 
One-year Expected 
Spillover 66 4.3 0.1 194.5 0.4 0.0 22.6 
Five-year Expected 








Table 1.15 Expected 1-Year MDBP Liability Spillovers Summary Statistics by Broad Industry Group 
(Companies with no missing expected MDBP liability spillovers) 
 
     Total  1-Year Expected MDBP  
     Liability Spillover as a  
  Total 1-Year Expected MDBP   Percentage of Percentage of 
  Liability Spillover ($ millions)  
Book Total  
Assets (%) 
Market Value of 
Equity (%) 
Broad Industry Group N Mean Median   Mean Median Mean Median 
Aircraft 3 3.59 0.02  0.07 0.00 0.12 0.00 
Construction/Engineering/Steel 13 0.69 0.09  0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Entertainment/Printing 11 0.36 0.07  0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Food/Retail 14 3.94 0.46  0.07 0.01 5.06 0.01 
Hotels/Casinos 0        
Mines/Coal/Oil 4 18.61 19.1  0.62 0.35 0.34 0.38 
Paper/Paperboard 4 0.36 0.36  0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 
Transportation 8 29.42 5.59  2.88 0.03 4.16 0.05 
Waste Management 6 0.64 0.54  0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Other 12 0.35 0.09   0.04 0.00 0.08 0.00 





















     Non-MDBP  
Companies 
 69 Companies 
3,369 
Companies 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
MDBP Liability and Liability Spillover 
 as a percentage of Long Term Debt 8.39 0.45   
Book D/A 0.84 0.82 0.66 0.65 
Book D/A consolidated with  
MDBP liability and Liability Spillover 0.88 0.85   
Market D/A 0.47 0.46 0.30 0.27 
Market D/A  consolidated with  
MDBP Liability and Liability Spillover 0.50 0.48   
Book D/(D+E) 0.62 0.60 0.44 0.44 
Book D/(D+E) consolidated with  
MDBP Liability and Liability Spillover 0.66 0.63   
Market Value of Equity ($ millions) 15,987 3,601 5,121 591 
Log of Total Book Assets 8.7 8.7 6.3 6.2 
Market to Book Ratio 3.2 1.9 7.0 2.1 
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30-Jul-10 3  1 2 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.0 0.00 
31-Aug-10 11  4 8 0.65 0.04 0.92 3.3 0.05 
30-Sep-10 17  6 13 0.60 0.10 0.55 3.3 0.04 
29-Oct-10 200  70 73 5.65 0.13 3.13 211.3 0.46 
30-Nov-10 203  70 73 5.65 0.13 3.13 211.3 0.46 
31-Dec-10 211  72 75 5.49 0.16 2.76 211.3 0.45 
31-Jan-11 230  78 79 7.06 0.24 1.91 213.6 0.46 
28-Feb-11 247  82 83 6.85 0.24 1.57 213.6 0.45 
31-Mar-11 265  85 83 6.85 0.24 1.51 213.8 0.45 
29-Apr-11 300  101 94 7.25 0.20 1.79 221.7 0.42 
31-May-11 305  103 96 6.52 0.20 0.99 194.5 0.36 
30-Jun-11 314  105 98 6.34 0.18 0.99 194.5 0.35 
29-Jul-11 325  109 102 6.26 0.18 1.25 194.5 0.34 
31-Aug-11 330  111 102 6.27 0.17 1.25 195.0 0.35 
30-Sep-11 335  114 103 6.38 0.16 1.51 195.0 0.34 
31-Oct-11 357  110 98 6.46 0.17 1.02 195.0 0.35 











Bankruptcy Event   Discounted 
Year   Event Discounted Expected 
1 2 3 4 5   Probability  Spillover ($m)  Spillover ($m) 
B      0.9 x 0.2 x0.7x(0.9x0.7)4=0.020 90 0.020x90=1.79 
C      0.9 x 0.8 x0.3x(0.9x0.8)4=0.058 120 0.058x120=6.97 
BC      0.9 x 0.2 x0.3x0.94=0.035 294.55 0.035x294.55=10.44 
 B     0.9x0.8x0.7x0.9 x 0.2 x0.7x(0.9x0.7)3=0.016 90/1.05=85.71 0.016x85.71=1.36 
 C     0.9x0.8x0.7x0.9 x 0.8 x0.3x(0.9x0.8)3=0.041 120/1.05=114.29 0.041x114.29=4.64 
 BC     0.9x0.8x0.7x0.9 x 0.2 x0.3x0.93=0.020 294.55/1.05=280.52 0.020x280.52=5.57 
B C     0.9 x 0.2 x0.7 x0.9 x0.3x0.93=0.025 90+204.55/1.05=284.81 0.025x284.81=7.06 
C B     0.9 x 0.8 x0.3 x0.9 x0.2x0.93=0.028 120+174.55/1.05=286.24 0.028x286.24=8.11 
  B    (0.9x0.8x0.7)2 x 0.9x0.2 x0.7x (0.9x0.7)2=0.013 90/1.052=81.63 0.013x81.63=1.04 
  C    (0.9x0.8x0.7)2x0.9 x 0.8 x0.3x(0.9x0.8)2=0.028 120/1.052=108.84 0.028x108.84=3.10 
  BC    (0.9x0.8x0.7)2x0.9 x 0.2 x0.3x0.92=0.011 294.55/1.052=267.17 0.011x267.17=2.97 
 B C    0.9x0.8x0.7x0.9 x 0.2 x0.7 x0.9 x0.3x0.92=0.014 90/1.05+204.55/1.052=271.25 0.014x271.25=3.77 
 C B    0.9x0.8x0.7x0.9 x 0.8 x0.3 x0.9 x0.2x0.92=0.016 120/1.05+174.55/1.052=272.61 0.016x272.61=4.33 
B   C    0.9x0.2x0.7x0.9x0.7x0.9x0.3x0.92=0.0174 90+204.55/1.052=275.53 0.0174x275.53=4.78 
C   B    0.9 x0.8 x 0.3 x0.9 x0.8 x0.9x0.2x0.92=0.023 120+174.55/1.052=278.32 0.023x278.32=6.31 
   B   (0.9x0.8x0.7)3 x 0.9x0.2 x0.7x0.9x0.7=0.010 90/1.053=77.75 0.010x77.75=0.79 
   C   (0.9x0.8x0.7)3x0.9 x 0.8 x0.3x0.9x0.8=0.020 120/1.053=103.66 0.020x103.66=2.06 
   BC   (0.9x0.8x0.7)3x0.9 x 0.2 x0.3x0.9=0.006 294.55/1.053=254.44 0.006x254.44=1.58 
  B C   (0.9x0.8x0.7)2x0.9 x 0.2 x0.7 x0.9 x0.3x0.9=0.008 90/1.052+204.55/1.053=258.33 0.008x258.33=2.01 
  C B   (0.9x0.8x0.7)2x0.9 x 0.8 x0.3 x0.9 x0.2x0.9=0.009 120/1.052+174.55/1.053=259.63 0.009x259.63=2.31 
 










Bankruptcy Event   Discounted 
Year   Event Discounted Expected 
1 2 3 4 5   Probability  Spillover ($m)  Spillover ($m) 
 B   C   0.9x0.8x0.7x0.9x0.2x0.7x0.9x0.7x0.9x0.3x0.9=0.010 90/1.05+204.55/1.053=262.41 0.010x262.41=2.55 
 C   B   0.9x0.8x0.7x0.9 x0.8 x 0.3 x0.9 x0.8 x0.9x0.2x0.9=0.013 120/1.05+174.55/1.053=265.07 0.013x265.07=3.37 
B     C   0.9 x0.2x0.7x(0.9x0.7)2x0.9x0.3X0.9=0.012 90+204.55/1.053=266.70 0.012x266.70=3.24 
C     B   0.9x0.8x0.3x(0.9x0.8)2x0.9x0.2x0.9=0.018 120+174.55/1.053=270.78 0.018x270.78=4.91 
    B   (0.9x0.8x0.7)4 x 0.9x0.2 x0.7 90/1.054=74.04 0.008x74.04=0.60 
    C   (0.9x0.8x0.7)4x0.9 x 0.8 x0.3=0.014 120/1.054=98.72 0.014x98.72=1.38 
    BC   (0.9x0.8x0.7)4x0.9 x 0.2 x0.3=0.003 294.55/1.054=242.33 0.003x242.33=0.84 
   B C   (0.9x0.8x0.7)3x0.9 x 0.2 x0.7 x0.9 x0.3=0.004 90/1.053+204.55/1.054=246.03 0.004x246.03=1.07 
   C B   (0.9x0.8x0.7)^3x0.9 x 0.8 x0.3 x0.9 x0.2=0.005 120/1.053+174.55/1.054=247.26 0.005x247.26=1.23 
  B   C   (0.9x0.8x0.7)2x0.9x0.2x0.7x0.9x0.7x0.9x0.3=0.005 90/1.052+204.55/1.054=249.92 0.005x249.92=1.36 
  C   B   (0.9x0.8x0.7)2x0.9 x0.8 x 0.3 x0.9 x0.8 x0.9x0.2=0.007 120/1.052+174.55/1.054=252.44 0.007x252.44=1.80 
 B     C   0.9x0.8x0.7x0.9 x0.2x0.7x(0.9x0.7)2x0.9x0.3=0.007 90/1.05+204.55/1.054=254.00 0.007x254.00=1.73 
 C     B   0.9x0.8x0.7x0.9x0.8x0.3x(0.9x0.8)2x0.9x0.2=0.010 120/1.05+174.55/1.054=257.89 0.010x257.89=2.62 
B       C   0.9x0.2x0.7x(0.9 x0.7)3x0.9x0.3=0.009 90+204.55/1.054=258.28 0.009x258.28=2.20 
C       B   0.9x0.8x0.3x(0.9 x0.8)3x0.9x0.2=0.015 120+174.55/1.054=263.60 0.015x263.60=3.83 
       Total Expected Spillover $114 million 
 
































Figure 1.5. Aggregate 1-Year Expected MDBP Liability Spillovers Revealed to Market 






Figure 1.6 Aggregate Industry 1-Year Expected MDBP Liability Spillovers Revealed by 






Figure 1.7. Sources of LMS Spillovers Onto Transportation/Aircraft Industry Companies. 
I show only LMS spillovers of more than $50 million or more than 1% of the company’s value of market equity as at November 30, 











Figure 1.8. Sources of LMS MDBP Liability Spillovers Onto Food/Retail/Drugs Companies. 
I show only LMS spillovers of more than $50 million or more than 1% of the company’s value of market equity as at November 30, 












Figure 1.9. Sources of LMS MDBP Liability Spillovers Onto Mines/Coal/Oil Companies. 
I show only LMS spillovers of more than $50 million or more than 1% of the company’s value of market equity as at November 30, 












Figure 1.10. Sources of LMS MDBP Liability Spillovers Onto Manufacturing Companies. 
I show only LMS spillovers of more than $50 million or more than 1% of the company’s value of market equity as at November 30, 










Figure 1.11. Sources of 1-Year Expected MDBP Liability Spillovers Onto Transportation/Aircraft Industry Companies. 











Figure 1.12. Sources of 1-Year Expected MDBP Liability Spillovers Onto Food/Retail/Drugs Companies. 










Figure 1.13. Sources of 1-Year Expected MDBP Liability Spillovers Onto Mines/Coal/Oil Companies. 











Figure 1.14. Sources of 1-Year expected MDBP Liability Spillovers Onto Construction/Engineering/Steel Companies. 
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                                                 CHAPTER 2 
 
           DOES MULTIEMPLOYER DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION 
                       PLAN MEMBERSHIP INFLUENCE STOCK 
                                     RETURN CO-MOVEMENT? 
 
                                  2.1 Introduction 
A multiemployer pension plan is a collectively bargained pension plan supported 
by two or more employers and one labor union.  For the 2010 plan year, there were 
1,471 U.S active private Multiemployer defined benefit pension plans (MDBPs) with 
10.6 million participants and $466 billion assets (U.S. Department of Labor Employee 
Benefits Security Administration, 2012).  Depletion of MDBP assets during the financial 
crisis together with low interest rates used to discount MDBP liabilities r esu l t ed  in  
unprecedented levels of aggregate MDBP underfunding (liabilities exceeding assets).  
At the beginning of the 2010 plan year, the aggregate value of MDBP vested pension 
benefits was $757 billion with an aggregate underfunding of $391 billion (Department 
of Labor, Department of the Treasury and PBGC, 2013).  In contrast, the aggregate 
underfunding of single employer defined benefit plans of the S&P 1500 companies was 
$229 billion at year-end 2009 (Geisel, 2012).  MDBPs exist in transient unionized 
industries such as construction, transportation, food, and retail to provide employees with 





MDBP employers pool risks, contributions, assets, and liabilities and jointly govern 
MDBPs together with labor representatives.  Companies can withdraw from MDBPs by 
paying their share of the MDBP’s unfunded vested liabilities, but usually withdrawal 
liabilities are larger than the company’s ongoing share of the MDBP’s unfunded vested 
liabilities31 and withdrawal may be onerous without the company’s unionized employees’ 
approval (Sanders, 2011).  When a bankrupt company withdraws from a MDBP before 
or during the bankruptcy process, the MDBP withdrawal liability is a general unsecured 
claim. Generally, in the case of MDBP employer bankruptcy, total MDBP liabilities 
remain virtually constant,32 but the number of contributing employers reduces, resulting in 
increased MDBP liabilities for the remaining nonbankrupt MDBP employers.   
The Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) does not assume a bankrupt 
company’s MDBP assets and liabilities but only intervenes when MDBPs themselves 
become insolvent (unable to pay current benefits out of plan resources).  Thus, MDBPs 
expose their participant companies to “liability spillover risks” from other companies 
in the same MDBP.  In contrast, SDBPs do not produce liability spillovers onto other 
companies because the PBGC takes over SDBPs terminated in bankruptcy.   
In this chapter, I examine whether MDBP membership influences company 
security returns’ co-movement.  I find that stock returns of MDBP sharing companies 
display positive statistically significant excess co-movement.  I measure the MDBP co-
movement of a stock by regressing its return against known risk factors and extracting the 
                                                          
31 MDBP withdrawal liabilities must cover the whole of the company’s share of the MDBP underfunding 
whereas when a company continues in a MDBP, employees shares some of the MDBP underfunding 
burden by relinquishing current wages, benefits or work rules (Moody’s 2009). 
 
32 Anecdotal evidence suggests that in most cases, MDBPs recover a small percentage of their unsecured 





residual.  I then regress the residual against the returns of an index of stocks with whom 
the company shares MDBPs.  I hypothesize that MDBP firms’ stock returns move together 
more than can be explained by known risk factors such as macroeconomic factors and 
industry factors. 
I find statistical evidence to suggest that MDBP sharing firms’ stock returns co-
movement changes after the public release of MDBP sharing firm information.  I propose 
four common risk-based explanations for MDBP sharing companies’ co-movement, 
namely: liability spillover risks (as described above), MDBP unfunded liability risks, 
labor contract risks, and geographic area risks. MDBPs expose each contributing 
company to unfunded liability risk because contributing companies must pay their share 
of the plan’s unfunded liabilities upon withdrawal and active contributing employers must 
often address serious MDBP underfunding through increased MDBP contributions.  
MDBPs pool assets and liabilities exposing participating companies to the same asset 
investment risks and liability risks resulting in shared company exposure to MDBP 
unfunded liability risk.  Multiemployer bargaining occurs when employers in the same 
industry form an association to negotiate with a single union (Employer withdrawal 
from multi-employer bargaining units: A proposal for self-regulation, 1982).  
Sanders (2011) explain that “Multiemployer contracts generally provide for uniform 
wages and benefits across an industry and locality for all association employers,” 
(p.344) exposing MDBP sharing companies to shared labor contract risks.  The majority 
of MDBPs cover a particular geographic area, e.g., The United Food and Commercial 
Workers (UFCW) Northern California Joint Pension, thus MDBP sharing companies 





MDBPs must file Form 5500 annually to satisfy the 1974 Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA) and IRS annual reporting requirements. For the 2009 plan 
year, for the first time MDBPs made mandatory disclosures on Form 5500 Schedule R 
about employers who contributed more than 5% of the total 2009 plan year MDBP 
contributions.  I utilize the new Form 5500 Schedule R contributing employer 
information to construct a measure of each public companies expected MDBP liability 
spillovers from other public companies.  I create an equallyweighted index of stocks with 
whom a company shares MDBPs and using this index, I investigate whether MDBP 
sharing companies’ stock returns co-move more than can be explained by documented 
risk factors.  I also create a spillover weighted MDBP index and a market value weighted 
MDBP index and use these indices to examine the co-movement of MDBP sharing 
companies’ stock returns. 
 
                             2.2 Hypothesis Development 
Roll (1988) using one model for non-news date market-model error variance and a 
second higher variance model for news date market-model error variance finds that (1) 
minimum ratio of news variance to noise variance is around 20 for the full sample but only 
around seven for the non-news dates sample and (2) the estimated probability of news is 
0.14 for the full sample and 0.18 for the non-news dates sample.  Roll concludes that his 
results suggest that either private information exists or that infrequent noninformation 
driven frenzies occur.  
Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) find that stock return synchronicity increases with 





increase the relative amount of market-wide and industry-level information in security 
prices and that insiders increase the relative amount of firm-specific information in 
security prices. 
Before the public release of MDBP major contributing company information, 
insiders, unions, institutional investors, MDBP administrators, MDBP actuaries, and 
credit rating companies had private information on companies’ MDBP liabilities and 
potential MDBP liability spillovers.  Moody’s (2006) provides public information on 
bond issuing companies’ own MDBP liabilities.  From the 10-K, the majority of investors 
could ascertain a firm’s MDBP membership but information needed to estimate potential 
MDBP liability spillovers was unavailable.  After the public release of MDBP major 
contributing company information, firm-specific MDBP information needed to estimate 
a firm’s potential MDBP liability spillovers from other firms became public.  The public 
release of MDBP major contributing company information increased the ratio of public 
information to private information for MDBP major contributing firms, changing 
investor’s information regarding MDBP companies’ shared systematic risk exposure.  
Therefore I hypothesize that the MDBP companies’ stock return co-movement changed 
after the public release of MDBP major contributing company information. 
If the 2009 plan year, Form 5500 revealed new public information about MDBP 
risks and MDBP associated risks are systematic risks then I expect that the MDBP index 














  Rejecting the null hypothesis will provide evidence to suggest that the 2009 plan 
year Form 5500 revealed new public information about MDBP risks and MDBP associated 
risks are systematic risks.  If I fail to reject the null hypothesis but the MDBP index 
coefficient is statistically significantly positive, then the statistical evidence suggests one 
of the two following caveats: (1) Market prices contained all MDBP information before 
the release of public MDBP information and/or (2) my event study methodology assumes 
constant risks; however, risks could change through time. 
 
                                   2.3 Literature Review 
My study relates to four strands of literature: co-movement, default correlation, 
contagion effects, and the effects of single employer defined benefit pensions (SDBP) on 
asset pricing. 
Pirinsky and Wang (2006) find strong co-movement amongst the stock returns of 
companies headquartered in the same geographic area.  The authors find no evidence 
to support the hypothesis that local economic conditions affect the firms’ 
fundamentals since same geographic area stocks’ earnings processes do not co-move.  
A state-level monthly economic activity measure explains some of stocks’ co-movement 
but its magnitude is insufficient to explain all of the local co-movement of stock returns.  
The authors find evidence supporting the geographic-segmentation explanation of local 






local investors such as small stocks. 
Ceteris paribus, expected MDBP liability spillovers result in increased firm 
default probabilities and increased correlations amongst default probabilities of MDBP 
sharing firms.  Merton (1974) models equity as a call option on a firm’s assets with the 
call’s strike price equal to the value of the firm’s liabilities.  In the event of a firm in an 
underfunded MDBP filing for bankruptcy, the MDBP liabilities of nonbankrupt firms in 
the same MDBP frequently increase, decreasing the nonbankrupt MDBP firm‘s equity 
value. 
Jarrow and Yu (2001) define counterparty risk as the risk that the default of a firm’s 
counterparty might affect its own default probability and introduce default process 
interdependency to Lando’s (1994, 1998) reduced form model33 by including a jump 
process in the set of state variables. The authors examine two firm looping defaults 
whereby each firm holds the other firm’s debt and show how counterparty risk increases 
default probability nonlinearly opposed to the no counterparty risk case. MDBPs expose 
contributing companies to “looped” liability spillover risks because MDBPs expose their 
contributing companies to each other’s unfunded MDBP liabilities. 
Frequently, MDBP contributing employers are competitors because they belong to 
the same industry in the same general location.  Lang and Stulz (1992) define the contagion 
effect as the change in value of the bankrupt firm’s competitors that cannot be characterized 
by the bankrupt firm’s wealth distribution and define the competitive effect as the wealth 
gain experienced by competitors because the bankruptcy transmits information about  the 
competitive positions of firms in the bankrupt firm’s industry.  The authors empirically 
                                                          
33 Lando’s model uses a doubly stochastic Poisson process to account for the dependency between credit 





disentangle the relative importance of the contagion and competitive effects for industries 
with different characteristics.  For industries with a debt-to-asset ratio exceeding the sample 
median, the authors find that the value of the competitors’ equity falls by 3% on average 
around the bankruptcy announcement, providing evidence that for highlyleveraged 
industries the contagion effect prevails.  Whereas, in less competitive industries34 with 
debt-to-asset ratio below the sample median, competitors’ equity increases by 2.2% around 
the bankruptcy announcement, providing evidence that for less competitive lowleveraged 
industries, the competitive effect prevails. 
Vassalou and Xing (2004) explain that one company’s default may have a 
domino effect on other firms, resulting in a systematic component in default risk.  
Using Merton’s (1974) model to measure default risk, the authors find evidence 
supporting the hypothesis that default risk has a systematic component and is priced in 
the cross-section of equity returns.  Specifically, the authors find that the aggregate 
survival rate change35 has a positive statistically significant risk premium when adding it 
as an explanatory variable to the Capital Asset Pricing Model and Fama and French’s three 
factor model.  
Das, Duffie, Kapadia, and  Saita (2007) find evidence that default clustering in 
data cannot be fully explained by observable factors. Jorion and Zhang (2009), using 
simulation, demonstrate that counterparty risk raises a company’s own default 
probability.  The authors evaluate 500 company defaults generated first by a 
conventional factor model (unconditional 1-year default probability of 1% and a 0.20 
                                                          
34 Less competitive industries are defined as industries where the Herfindahl index (a proxy for imperfect 
competition) is less than the sample median. 
35 Survival rate is defined as one minus the probability of default.  Change in survival rate is defined as 





pair-wise default correlation coefficient) and then by adding counterparty risk to the 
baseline model (three counterparties for each company with a 30% debt recovery rate).  
With counterparty risk, the default correlation increases to 0.0262 from a baseline 
default correlation of 0.0243.  Moreover, the simulation results support the hypothesis 
that counterparty risk contributes to the fat tails observed in default distributions; with 
counterparty risk, the default distribution’s 99.99th percentile increases from 115 to 127 
defaults. 
MDBP liability spillover risks and counterparty risks share many similar 
attributes, bankrupt MDBP contributing companies may increase the liabilities of other 
contributing MDBP sharing companies, increasing default correlation amongst MDBP 
sharing companies.  Das et al. (2007) report that firms’ exposure to common or correlated 
risk factor co-movement is a possible explanation for firm default clustering in time.  
My research documents co-movement amongst the stock returns of public MDBP 
sharing companies, lending support to the hypothesis that MDBP companies share 
exposure to common risk factors. 
Jin, Merton, and  Bodie (2006) find evidence of a positive relationship between 
SDBP pension risk and firm risk. The authors perform a panel regression of firm beta 
on SDBP beta and find that assuming a 0.18 pension liability beta, one unit of pension 
risk increases the firm risk by 1.33 to 1.51 units and assuming a 0.46 pension liability beta, 
one unit of pension risk increases the firm risk by 0.79 to 0.83 units. 
Franzoni and Marin (2006) find that portfolios of companies with the most 
underfunded SDBPs earn lower returns than portfolios of companies with healthier 





appears.  The most underfunded SDBP portfolio’s risk-adjusted returns are significantly 
negative with a magnitude of approximately 10% annually. 
 
                                     2.4 Data Collection 
First, I collect information on which public companies share MDBPs and then I 
construct a measure of public companies’ expected MDBP liability spillovers from 
other public companies available to market participants on a monthly basis. 
Form 5500 contains information on MDBP assets, liabilities, and employer 
contributions.  From the 2009 plan year onwards, investors can estimate MDBP liabilities 
of major contributing companies using Form 5500 information; however, it is necessary 
to link subsidiaries to their parents in order to obtain good estimates of a public company’s 
total MDBP liabilities.  For fiscal years ending after December 15, 2011, investors can 
use 10-K information together with Form 5500 information to estimate public companies’ 
MDBP liabilities.  I download the 2009 Form 5500 (All) data from the Department of 
Labor website (http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/foia/foia-5500.html). I merge the 2009 Form 
5500(All) data with the 2009 Form 5500 schedule H, schedule MB, and schedule R data 
using the MDBP filing’s unique key.  The downloaded dataset includes MDBPs, SDBPs, 
multiemployer plans, and direct filing entities; therefore, I select MDBPs with filing status 
not equal to ‘processing_stopped’.36  I select MDBPs with Schedule R attached because I 
require information on MDBP contributing employers.  The 2009 MDBP datasets 
contains some filings prior to 2009 therefore I select plans with a 2009 MDBP valuation 
                                                          
36  EFAST2 Program Management Office personnel informed me that the public could view ‘filing_error’ 






year and missing valuation date plans with a 2009 form year begin date.  In order to 
construct each contributing employers’ MDBP unfunded liability, I need the MDBP total 
unfunded liability; therefore, I delete observations with either a missing Form 5500 
Schedule R’s RPA94 liability or a missing Form 5500 Schedule H’s end of year net plan 
assets.  MDBPs are uniquely identified by their employer identification number (EIN) 
and their plan number but may have multiple filings; in the case of multiple filings, I select 
the plan filing with the earliest filing date and contributing employer Schedule R 
information.  
I identify and collect data on both public parent companies and their subsidiaries 
who contribute to MDBPs.  Form 5500 schedule R lists both the contributing employer’s 
name and the contributing employer’s EIN.  I wish to match Schedule R subsidiaries to 
their public parent companies.  However, as Rauh et al. (2013) explain, subsidiaries may 
have a different EIN from its parent, 
Under the current IRS rules, subsidiaries that are at least 80% owned by the 
parent may elect to file consolidated income tax returns. But they can also choose 
to file taxes separately while still remaining consolidated with the parent 
company for financial purposes. In this case, the EIN and the sponsor name 
reported in Form 5500 will differ from its parent’s. (p. 12)  
 
In order to identify public parents of Schedule R companies, I follow Rauh et al. 
(2013) and match the Schedule R Company’s EIN to public parent’s EIN using 
COMPUSTAST EINs.  For companies unmatched to a public parent using EINs, I use the 
Schedule R company name to search Hoover’s database for potential public parents. Several 
companies may have the same name, so I use the MDBP industry and location to identify 
the correct Hoover’s company. 





for the Schedule R company name on Exhibit 21 (listing of active subsidiaries) of the 
potential public parent’s 10-K37.  When the Schedule R company does not appear on Exhibit 
21, I search the rest of the public company’s 10-K for the Schedule R company name. Public 
companies need only list in Exhibit 21 their “significant” subsidiaries who contribute more 
than 10% of consolidated assets or pretax income at the end of the last fiscal year (Lignon 
and Malm (2013)); therefore, if neither Exhibit 21 nor the remaining 10-K mention the 
Schedule R company, I ascertain whether the Schedule R company’s website reveals that 
the company has a public parent. If I still cannot verify the Hoover’s Schedule R company 
match to its public parent, I search the internet to ascertain whether the Schedule R 
company’s EIN can be linked to a public company’s pension plan.  I also use einfinder.com 
to match Schedule R company’s EINs with a public company.  Lastly, I search the internet 
for court documents or news stories linking the Schedule R company to its public parent. 
In order to be included in my sample, I require that MDBPs have at least one 
U.S. incorporated public firm listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX on the 
exchanges on the plan’s filing date.  In my sample, I require that the Schedule R company 
match to its Hoover’s public parent can be verified by at least one of the methods outlined 
above in order to assign it to a public parent.  I delete companies making a MDBP 
withdrawal liability payment.  In the case of more than one public company observation 
for the same MDBP; I sum the pension contributions across observations and 
consolidate the public company information into one MDBP public company 
observation. 
In order to collate expected MDBP liability spillover information available to 
                                                          





market participants, I calculate expected MDBP liability spillovers from publicly available 
Form 5500 filings on a monthly basis from July 30, 2010, to November 30, 2011.  I choose 
an initial date of July 30, 2010, because the date of the first 2009 plan year MDBP Form 
5500 filing with at least two Schedule R public companies is July 28, 2010.  I chose a final 
date of November 30, 2010, because for fiscal years ending after December 15, 2011 public 
companies must disclose their significant MDBPs in their 10-Ks. 
I use the most recent publicly available MDBP information, when a MDBP 
files its 2010 plan year information before the end of the month; I replace the MDBP 
2009 plan year information with the MDBP 2010 plan year information.  I also add 
information from 2010 plan year MDBP filings for plans that are not included in my 
2009 plan year data set but list at least one of the EINS associated with my 2009 plan 
year public companies in their 2010 plan year Schedule R.  In order to calculate 
bankruptcy probabilities, I calculate Altman (1968) Z-scores from COMPUSTAT data 
with company fiscal year ends at least four months before the month’s end date.  I lag 
four months to ensure that the Z-score information was available to market participants 
at the month’s end date. 
 
                                    2.5 Sample Selection 
For the 2009 plan year, there are 4,902 first filing observations associated with 
1,366 unique MDBPs.  I delete 10 observations from the Pennsylvania Heavy and 
Highway Contractors Pension Trust because there are three observations for each of the 
five Schedule R employers with the same total employer contribution but different 





contribution is a withdrawal payment. 
There are 1,389 observations, 333 unique MDBPs, and 529 public company 
observation for MDBPs with at least one U.S. incorporated public company listed on 
Schedule R.  I lose 40 observations because I consolidate all public company observations 
in the same MDBP into one public company MDBP observation.  My final 2009 plan 
year sample consists of 1,349 observations, 333 unique MDBPs, and 489 public company 
observations associated with 154 unique public companies with 144 U.S. incorporated 
public companies. 
In order to examine expected spillover information disclosed to the market by 
Form 5550 filings through time, I calculate expected liability spillovers available from 
public Form 5500 information on a monthly basis. I have 17 month end-dates starting at 
July 30, 2010 and ending on November 30, 2011.  I collect the most recently available 
Form 5500 information; therefore, I replace 189 2009 plan year MDBPs with their 
corresponding 2010 plan year MDBP.  Twenty-three MDBPs no longer list any 2009 plan 
year public companies on their 2010 plan year Schedule R.  I include 25 new 2010 plan 
year MDBPs which contain at least one Schedule R employer EIN associated with my 
2009 plan year public companies where the 2009 plan year public company was not 
previously listed on the MDBP’s 2009 plan year Schedule R. 
In order to calculate expected liability spillovers, there must be at least two public 
companies listed on a MDBP’s Schedule R and all public company bankruptcy 
probabilities must be nonmissing.  A company must have at least one nonmissing one-
year expected liability spillover to enter my co-movement sample, 84 companies meet 





84 companies in my co-movement sample in Table 2.1.  I collect stock return data from 
CRSP.  
MDBP companies may be involved in mergers and acquisitions.  When I initially 
match schedule R companies to public companies, I assign a Schedule R company to a 
public company at the 2009 plan year Form 5500 filing date.  However, I wish to 
investigate MDBP sharing companies’ stock return co-movement from June 2005 to 
November 2011 inclusive; I therefore search the SDC database for mergers and 
acquisitions during this period and I adjust my co-movement dataset accordingly. 
 
             2.6 Co-movement of MDBP Sharing Companies 
I examine the co-movement of MDBP sharing firms five years before the 
revelation of the 2009 plan year Form 5500 information, during, and after the revelation 
of the 2009 plan year Form 5500 information from July 2010 to November 2011 inclusive.  
For each company’s stock, I construct a MDBP spillover index by equal weighting the 
returns of stocks with whom the company shares MDBP(s).  In my main analysis, I follow 
Pirinsky and Wang (2006) and use an equally weighted MDBP spillover index.  I choose 
an equally weighted MDBP spillover index for my primary investigation because I do not 
have sufficient information to construct a spillover weighted MDBP spillover index 
before the public release of major MDBP contributing employer information. 
For robustness checks, I also use MDBP spillover indices value weighted by 
market value and weighted by expected 1-year expected MDBP liability spillovers, in 
Chambers (2016); I explain how I calculate expected 1-year MDBP liability spillovers.  





onto the company from each of the stock index companies to weight the index’s returns.  
For example, company A shares MDBP(s) with companies B, C, and D. Expected MDBP 
liability spillover onto company A are $2 million, $5 million, and $3 million from 
companies B, C, and D, respectively. I weight company B’s stock return 0.2, company 
C’s stock return 0.5, and company D’s stock return 0.3, respectively.  I regress public 
MDBP firms’ stock returns on known risk factors and then regress the risk factor 
regression’s residual on an index of the stock returns of companies with whom the firm 
shares MDBPs: 
Ri,t = αi + β
MKTRt
MKT + ϵi,t  
ϵi,t = φi + γ−i
MDBP_SPILLRi,t
MDBP_SPILL + μi,t 
where Ri,t is the monthly return of a particular MDBP firm’s stock, Ri,t
MDBP_SPILL is the 
monthly return of the stock’s corresponding MDBP index, and  Rt
MKTis the monthly return 
of the stock market value-weighted index of all U.S. public stock returns.  I calculate 
returns in excess of monthly T-bill rates.  MDBP sharing firms are frequently in the same 
industry. In order to control for industry effects, I add an industry index of the stock’s 
industry group to the risk factor regression.  I use Fama and French’s (1997) industry 
classifications to designate stocks into 48 industry groups.  I estimate the following stock-
level time-series regression: 






ϵi,t = φi + γ−i
MDBP_SPILLRi,t
MDBP_SPILL + μi,t  
where Rt
FF_INDis the monthly return of the stock’s Fama and French (1997) corresponding 
industry index.  I also use CRSP two-digit SIC codes and four-digit SIC codes to assign 







time-series regressions.  First, I use a two-digit SIC code (2SIC_IND) to construct the 
industry portfolio:  





   
ϵi,t = φi + γ−i
MDBP_SPILLRi,t
MDBP_SPILL + μi,t  
Second, I use a four-digit SIC code (4SIC_IND) to construct the industry portfolio: 





                           
ϵi,t = φi + γ−i
MDBP_SPILLRi,t
MDBP_SPILL + μi,t  
In order to control for other known risk factors, I add the three Carhart (1997) 
factors to estimate the following three stock-level time-series regressions:  First, I use 
Fama and French’s (1997) 48 industry classifications (FF_IND) to construct the industry 
portfolio: 







MOM+ϵi,t                                                                                   
  ϵi,t = φi + γ−i
MDBP_SPILLRi,t
MDBP_SPILL + μi,t  
Second, I use a two-digit SIC code (2SIC_IND) to construct the industry portfolio: 







MOM+ϵi,t                     
ϵi,t = φi + γ−i
MDBP_SPILLRi,t
MDBP_SPILL + μi,t  
Third, I use a four-digit SIC code (4SIC_IND) to construct the industry portfolio: 
















                                          ϵi,t = φi + γ−i
MDBP_SPILLRi,t
MDBP_SPILL + μi,t                             (2.8) 
   
I estimate the time-series regressions (2.2) to (2.8) for the 17-month period from 
July 2010 to November 2011 inclusive with an equally weighted MDBP spillover index 
and I present the results in Table 2.2.  The MDBP spillover index coefficient 
γEW_MDBP_SPILL ranges from 0.012 to 0.094 across the seven models and is positively 
statistically significant in all models except for the two models using a four-digit SIC 
industry portfolio.  Introducing a two-digit SIC industry factor reduces the magnitude of 
 γEW_MDBP_SPILL by almost one half (0.094 to 0.048) and also reduces the MDBP spillover 
index coefficient’s statistical significance; however, the MDBP spillover index coefficient 
still remains positively statistically significant.  I estimate the time-series regressions (2.2) 
to (2.8) for the 17-month period from July 2010 to November 2011 inclusive with a 
spillover weighted MDBP spillover index and market value weighted industry portfolios; 
I present the results in Table 2.3.   
In most models, the magnitude of the spillover weighted MDBP spillover index 
coefficient γSW_MDBP_SPILL is slightly smaller than its equally weighted counterpart but its 
statistical significance is very similar to its equally weighted counterpart.  I estimate the 
time-series regressions (2.2) to (2.8) for the 17-month period from July 2010 to November 
2011 inclusive with a market value weighted MDBP spillover index and market value 
weighted industry portfolios, I present the results in Table 2.4.  In most models, the  
market value weighted MDBP spillover index coefficient γMW_MDBP_SPILL is statistically 
insignificant. 
MDBPs did not file contributing employer information before June 2010; 





the company weights as at September 2011 when all the 2009 plan year Form 5500 had 
filed.  I estimate the time-series regressions (2.2) to (2.8) for the five-year period before 
the 2009 plan year MDBP filings and present the results in Table 2.5.  The MDBP 
spillover index coefficient γEW_MDBP_SPILL ranges from 0.069 to 0.219 across the seven 
models and is positively statistically significant in all seven models.  Introducing a two-
digit SIC industry factor reduces the magnitude of γEW_MDBP_SPILL by 58% (0.219 to 
0.092); however, the MDBP spillover index coefficient still remains positively 
statistically significant. Moreover, γEW_MDBP_SPILL is statistically significant from zero 
with a four-digit SIC industry factor.   
The equally weighted MDBP spillover index coefficient γEW_MDBP_SPILL is almost 
twice the size and more positively significant before the public revelation of major MDBP 
employer contributors than after the public revelation of major MDBP employer 
contributors.  In order to investigate this phenomenon further, I split the five-year period 
into three sub-periods: the pre-financial crisis period, the financial crisis period, and the 
post-financial crisis period.  I present the time-series regressions (2.2) to (2.8) for the three 
sub-periods in Tables 2.6, 2.7, and, 2.8.  
 
      2.7 Cross-sectional Determinants of MDBP Company  
                                                 Stock Return Co-movement 
I investigate the cross-sectional sources of MDBP co-movement in regard to firm 
and MDBP characteristics. First, I run the pair-wise regressions (2.9) and (2.10) during 
and after the revelation of 2009 plan year Form 5500 information from July 2010 to 





Specifically, I regress MDBP contributing company stock returns against each of the stock 
returns of companies with whom it shares MDBPs.  First, I use Fama and French’s (1997) 
48 industry classifications (FF_IND) to construct the industry portfolio: 








Second, I use a two-digit SIC code (2SIC_IND) to construct the industry portfolio: 









MDBP_SHARING_COMPANYis the monthly return of a company with which the 
dependent variable company shares MDBPs. I regress the 
MDBP_SHARING_COMPANY beta as the dependent variable against the following 
COMPUSTAT firm and MDBP characteristic independent variables: 
 Company_Spill– the expected MDBP liability spillover from the 
independent company in the pair-wise regressions ((2.9) and (2.10)) onto 
the dependent company in the pair-wise regressions ((2.9) and (2.10)) as a 
percentage of the dependent company’s market value of equity. 
 Size – the natural logarithm of the market value of the stock. 
 Leverage– the ratio of total debt over assets. 
 Market-to-Book – the market-to-book equity ratio calculated as the market 
value of equity over the book value of equity. 
 ROA – return on assets. 







company in the pair-wise regressions ((2.9) and (2.10)) has the same four-
digit SIC code as the dependent company in the pair-wise regressions. 
 Z-score – the negative Altman (1968) Z-score. 
I average the above variables across the 17-month period (July 2010 to November 




= 𝛼𝑖 + 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦_𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖,𝑗 + 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑡𝑜_𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖
+ 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒_4𝑑𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡_𝑆𝐼𝐶𝑖 + 𝑍_𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
In order to reduce dependency amongst the MDBP_SHARING_COMPANY betas, I split 
the sample into two sub-samples: betas where the dependent company is the most credit 
worthy (lowest Z-score) in the pair-wise regression (2.9) and (2.10) and betas where the 
dependent company is the least credit worthy (highest Z-score) in the pair-wise regressions 
(2.9) and (2.10).  I present the results for regression (2.11) in Table 2.9.  I note that the 
cross-sectional model (2.11) has no explanatory power for the most credit worthy company 
sub-sample and has very little explanatory power for the least credit worthy company sub-
sample.  Interestingly, for the least credit worthy sub-sample, the COMPANY_SPILL 
coefficient is negative and statistically significant. 
 
                       2.8 Hypothesis Test Results 














I compare the spillover index coefficients from before the 2009 plan year 
revelation period (June 2005 to May 2010) and during and after the 2009 plan year 
revelation period (July 2010 to November 2011).  I conduct a Welch’s two sample t-test 
(Clogg, Petkova, & Haritou, 1995) to examine whether the MDBP index coefficient 
changes after the public release of MDBP contributing company information. I use the 
following test statistic: 
𝑡 =
𝛾𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒











Welch’s two sample t-test assumes that the two samples are independent however 
the two periods’ samples may be correlated.  I find extremely small correlations amongst 
the two periods’ variables, the largest correlation magnitude is -0.0125, therefore, I 
believe that the independent sample assumption is reasonable.  I summarize my results 
in Table 2.10 for the equally weighted MDBP index coefficient γEW_MDBP_SPILL and 
equally weighted industry portfolios.  Using the two sample t statistic, the MDBP index 
coefficients are statistically different from each other in six of the seven models.   
I perform a robustness test whereby I equally weight the MDBP spillover index 
for during and after the 2009 plan year revelation period (July 2010 to November 
2011) using the weights from September 2011 when all 2009 plan year MDBP 
information was publicly available.  I present the results in Table 2.11.  Using the two 
sample t statistic, the MDBP index coefficients are statistically different from each other 
in all models except the two models using a two-digit SIC industry portfolio. 
I use a market value weighted MDBP index coefficient γMW_MDBP_SPILL and 






summarize my results in Table 2.12. Using the two sample t statistic, the MDBP market 
value weighted index coefficients are statistically different from each other in only three 
of the seven models.   
 
                                  2.9 Conclusion 
I find positively statistically significant excess co-movement amongst MDBP 
sharing companies.  I propose four common risk-based explanations for MDBP 
sharing companies’ co-movement, namely: liability spillover risks, MDBP unfunded 
liability risks, labor contract risks, and geographic area risks.  Using an equally 
weighted MDBP index and equally weighted industry portfolios, six of my seven 
models provide statistical evidence to suggest that that MDBP sharing firm’s excess 
co-movement changes after the public release of MDBP sharing firm information.  
However, using a market value weighted MDBP index and a market value weighted 
industry portfolios only three of my seven models provide statistical evidence to 
suggest that that MDBP sharing firm’s excess co-movement changes after the public 






Table 2.1 Summary Statistics for MDBP Liability Spillover Companies 
 
  N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard 
Deviation 
Skew 
Market Value of                            
Equity  
($ millions) 
84 17516.0 3504.0 91.0 194155.0 35864.0 3.4 
Book Value of                                 
Total Assets 
 ($ millions) 
84 29386.0 6165.0 240.0 751216.0 88834.0 6.9 
Market to Book 
Ratio 
78 3.2 1.8 0.7 23.6 4.1 3.3 








($ millions)  
 
($ millions) 
84 7.1 0.2 0.0 221.7 27.7 6.5 
Mean Expected 
Spillover as a 
Percentage of 
Market Value of 
Equity (%) 
84 0.5 0.0 0.0 25.9 2.9 8.6 
Maximum 
Expected 
Spillover as a  
Percentage of 
Market Value of 
Equity (%)   




Table 2.2 Spillover Co-movement July 2010 to November 2011 With an Equally Weighted Spillover Portfolio  
(994 observations) 
 
    γEW_MDBP_SPILL βMKT βEQ_FF_IND βEQ_2SIC_IND βEQ_4SIC_IND βSMB βHML βMOM 
Model 1          
Parameter Estimate  0.094 1.368       
t-stat   2.74** 37.58***       
Model 2          
Parameter Estimate  0.060 0.269 0.877      
t-stat   2.17** 1.28 5.20***      
Model 3          
Parameter Estimate  0.048 0.197  0.937     
t-stat   2.07* 1.21  7.38***     
Model 4          
Parameter Estimate  0.013 0.217   0.877    
t-stat  0.57 2.57**   14.24***    
Model 5          
Parameter Estimate  0.055 0.434 0.980   -0.835 -0.050 0.215 
t-stat  2.02* 2.56** 6.76***   -4.88*** -0.46 1.89* 
Model 6          
Parameter Estimate  0.044 0.394  1.009  -0.830 0.016 0.242 
t-stat  1.96* 2.54**  9.07***  -7.10*** 0.13 2.91** 
Model 7          
Parameter Estimate  0.012 0.341   0.882 -0.377 -0.006 0.077 
t-stat    0.53 3.82***     14.37*** -3.60*** -0.08 1.55 
 
*denotes statistical significance at the 10% level of significance **denotes statistical significance at the 5% level of significance 








Table 2.3 Spillover Co-movement July 2010 to November 2011 With a Spillover Weighted Spillover Portfolio  
(994 observations) 
 
    γSW_MDBP_SPILL βMKT βEW_FF_IND βEW_2SIC_IND βEW_4SIC_IND βSMB βHML βMOM 
Model 1          
Parameter Estimate  0.080 1.368       
t-stat   2.69** 37.58***       
Model 2          
Parameter Estimate  0.053 0.269 0.877      
t-stat   2.00* 1.28 5.20***      
Model 3          
Parameter Estimate  0.043 0.197  0.937     
t-stat   2.29** 1.21  7.38***     
Model 4          
Parameter Estimate  0.018 0.217   0.877    
t-stat   0.87 2.57**   14.24***    
Model 5          
Parameter Estimate  0.048 0.434 0.980   -0.835 -0.050 0.215 
t-stat  1.77* 2.56** 6.76***   -4.88*** -0.46 1.89* 
Model 6          
Parameter Estimate  0.038 0.395  1.009  -0.830 0.016 0.242 
t-stat   2.02* 2.54**  9.07***  -7.10*** 0.13 2.91** 
Model 7          
Parameter  
Estimate  0.017 0.341   0.882 -0.377 -0.006 0.077 
t-stat    0.79 3.82***     14.37*** -3.60*** -0.08 1.55 
 
*denotes statistical significance at the 10% level of significance **denotes statistical significance at the 5% level of significance 







Table 2.4 Spillover Co-movement July 2010 to November 2011 With a Market Value Weighted Spillover Portfolio  
(994 observations) 
 
    γMW_MDBP_SPILL βMKT βVW_FF_IND 
 
βVW_2SIC_IND βVW_4SIC_IND βSMB βHML βMOM 
Model 1          
Parameter Estimate  0.104 1.376       
t-stat   3.03*** 37.58***       
Model 2          
Parameter Estimate    0.048 0.353 0.935      
t-stat   1.73  3.28*** 12.23***      
Model 3          
Parameter Estimate   0.037 0.354  0.935     
t-stat   1.20 3.56***  13.06***     
Model 4          
Parameter Estimate  -0.006 0.260   0.903    
t-stat         -0.23 4.64***   27.12***    
Model 5          
Parameter Estimate  0.049 0.466 0.953   -0.408 0.106 0.141 
t-stat  1.90* 4.46*** 12.84***   -3.32*** 1.06 1.84* 
Model 6          
Parameter Estimate  0.037 0.485      0.961  -0.497 0.173 0.162 
t-stat  1.35 5.15***  12.82***  -3.76*** 1.54 2.24** 
Model 7          
Parameter Estimate  -0.005 0.351   0.904 -0.286 0.074 0.134 
t-stat    -0.22 4.76***     27.04*** -1.92*     0.79 1.22 
 
*denotes statistical significance at the 10% level of significance **denotes statistical significance at the 5% level of significance 




Table 2.5 Spillover Co-movement June 2005 to May 2010 With an Equally Weighted Spillover Portfolio  
(2,086 observations) 
 
  γEW_MDBP_SPILL βMKT βEQ_FF_IND βEQ_2SIC_IND βEQ_4SIC_IND βSMB βHML βMOM 
Model 1         
Parameter  Estimate 0.219 1.420       
t-stat  6.33*** 11.51***       
Model 2         
Parameter  Estimate 0.131 0.135 0.963      
t-stat  7.33*** 0.79 7.16***      
Model 3         
Parameter  Estimate 0.092 -0.038  1.098     
t-stat  6.08*** -0.23  8.19***     
Model 4         
Parameter  Estimate 0.074 0.178   0.926    
t-stat  3.53*** 2.36**   13.12***    
Model 5         
Parameter  Estimate 0.129 0.106 0.937   0.007 0.130 -0.049 
t-stat  7.78*** 0.67 7.12***   0.04 1.05 -0.99 
Model 6         
Parameter  Estimate 0.091 -0.058  1.098  -0.101 0.073 -0.030 
t-stat  6.17*** -0.36  7.96***  -0.53 0.60 -0.58 
Model 7         
Parameter  Estimate 0.069 0.119   0.911 0.147 0.020 -0.084 
t-stat  4.22*** 1.35     13.97*** 1.35 0.21 -1.70 
 
*denotes statistical significance at the 10% level of significance **denotes statistical significance at the 5% level of significance 







Table 2.6 Spillover Co-movement June 2005 to July 2007 With an Equally Weighted Spillover Portfolio  
(1,655 observations) 
 
  γEW_MDBP_SPILL βMKT βEw_FF_IND βEQ_2SIC_IND βEQ_4SIC_IND βSMB βHML βMOM 
Model 1         
Parameter  Estimate 0.240 1.395       
t-stat  6.32*** 19.07***       
Model 2         
Parameter  Estimate 0.144 0.347 0.794      
t-stat  5.70*** 2.20** 10.96***      
Model 3         
Parameter Estimate 0.121 0.355  0.809     
t-stat  5.04*** 2.53***  13.12**     
Model 4         
Parameter  Estimate 0.091 0.379   0.780    
t-stat  4.05*** 4.18**   18.84***    
Model 5         
Parameter  Estimate 0.142 0.370 0.841   -0.192 -0.133 -0.025 
t-stat  5.31*** 2.50** 9.61***   -1.26 -1.20 -0.28 
Model 6         
Parameter  Estimate 0.116 0.384  0.863  -0.231 -0.241 -0.025 
t-stat  4.53*** 2.97**  12.74***  -1.76* -2.28** -0.31 
Model 7         
Parameter  Estimate 0.090 0.392   0.786 -0.049 -0.159 -0.075 
t-stat  3.87*** 4.34     18.25*** -0.52 -1.69 -1.15 
 
*denotes statistical significance at the 10% level of significance **denotes statistical significance at the 5% level of significance 









Table 2.7 Spillover Co-movement August 2007 to December 2009 With an Equally Weighted Spillover Portfolio  
(1,181 observations) 
 
  γEW_MDBP_SPILL βMKT βEQ_FF_IND βEQ_2SIC_IND βEQ_4SIC_IND βSMB βHML βMOM 
Model 1         
Parameter  Estimate 0.285 1.276       
t-stat  5.71*** 14.38***       
Model 2         
Parameter  Estimate 0.161 -0.014 1.047      
t-stat  5.85*** -0.14 13.21***      
Model 3         
Parameter  Estimate 0.122 -0.119  1.169     
t-stat  6.16*** -0.79  10.74***     
Model 4         
Parameter  Estimate 0.070 0.059   1.017    
t-stat  3.56*** 0.57   14.58***    
Model 5         
Parameter  Estimate 0.152 -0.108 1.058   0.007 -0.620 -0.327 
t-stat  6.18*** -0.90 11.28***   0.04 -5.75*** -6.20*** 
Model 6         
Parameter  Estimate 0.112 -0.209  1.195  -0.196 -0.547 -0.364 
t-stat  6.29*** -1.52  10.33***  -1.02 -5.11*** -5.88*** 
Model 7         
Parameter  Estimate 0.067 0.024   1.011 0.005 -0.287 -0.170 
t-stat  3.40***   0.28     13.79*** 0.05 -2.61** -3.22*** 
 
*denotes statistical significance at the 10% level of significance.**denotes statistical significance at the 5% level of significance 









Table 2.8 Spillover Co-movement January 2009 to May 2010 With an Equally Weighted Spillover Portfolio  
(1,255 observations) 
 
  γEW_MDBP_SPILL βMKT βEW_FF_IND βEW_2SIC_IND βEW_4SIC_IND βSMB βHML βMOM  
Model 1          
Parameter Estimate 0.186 1.562        
t-stat  3.23*** 7.09***        
Model 2          
Parameter Estimate 0.112 0.197 1.03       
t-stat  4.14*** 0.65 4.20***       
Model 3          
Parameter Estimate 0.064 -0.084  1.219      
t-stat  2.82** -0.27  4.94***      
Model 4          
Parameter Estimate 0.071 0.258   0.929     
t-stat  2.04** 2.10*   7.35***     
Model 5          
Parameter Estimate 0.108 0.063 0.983   0.142 0.265 -0.032  
t-stat  4.35*** 0.19 3.50***   0.44 2.09* -0.50  
Model 6          
Parameter Estimate 0.063 -0.180  1.224  -0.003 0.195 0.021  
t-stat  2.65** -0.57  4.36***  -0.01 1.48 0.35  
Model 7          
Parameter Estimate 0.059 0.104   0.902 0.381 0.091 -0.101  
t-stat  2.44** 0.66     7.61*** 1.98* 0.95 -2.47**  
 
*denotes statistical significance at the 10% level of significance.**denotes statistical significance at the 5% level of significance 







Table 2.9 Cross-Sectional Determinants for MDBP Sharing Companies’ Co-movement July 2010 to November 2011 
(1) Full Sample (2) Influential Observations Deleted (Cook’s Distance greater than one) 
 
 
 FF48 Industry Portfolio  Two-digit SIC Industry Portfolio 
 Least Creditworthy Most Creditworthy  Least Creditworthy Most Creditworthy 
  (1) (2) (1) (2)  (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Intercept 0.933 0.988 3.308 4.054  1.005 1.074 2.512 3.050 
t stat 1.52 1.62 1.43 1.38  1.82* 1.99** 1.10 1.05 
Company_Spill -0.140 -4.041 0.022 -2.535  -0.139 -5.049 0.004 -1.840 
t  stat -1.72* -2.35** 0.97 -1.12  -1.83* -2.73*** 0.22 -0.83 
Size 0.009 0.011 -0.331 -0.381  -0.009 -0.007 -0.211 -0.247 
t stat 0.14 0.16 -1.36 -1.34  -0.14 -0.11 -0.88 -0.88 
Leverage -0.613 -0.681 1.906 1.668  -0.519 -0.605 1.1764 1.593 
t stat -1.77* -2.06** -1.36 1.05  -1.33 -1.87* 0.98 0.99 
Market-to-Book -0.022 -0.021 -0.121 -0.085  -0.018 -0.9 -0.088 -0.062 
t stat -1.16 -1.11 -1.14 -1.08  -0.95 -1.16 -0.84 -0.80 
ROA -3.266 -6.272 15.39 14.432  -2.491 -6.273 9.299 8.608 
t  stat -1.07 -1.69* 1.45 1.46  -0.77 -2.60*** 0.90 0.90 
Same four-digit SIC 0.25 0.235 -0.423 -0.431  0.002 -0.017 -0.625 -0.624 
t  stat 1.10 0.98 -0.84 -0.82  0.01 -0.07 -1.21 -1.20 
Negative Altman Z-score 0.128 0.079 0.488 0.509  0.183 0.123 0.479 0.495 
t  stat 1.69* 1.11 1.35 1.35  1.98** 1.43 1.33 1.32 
Number of           
Observations 87 86 97 96  87 86 97 96 
Adjusted R2 0.045 0.102 -0.040 -0.038  0.052 0.162 -0.049 -0.049 
 
*denotes statistical significance at the 10% level of significance **denotes statistical significance at the 5% level of significance 






Table 2.10 Comparison of MDBP Spillover Index Coefficients With an Equally Weighted 







Two sample t-test for  
MDBP Index Coefficient  
Equality 
t value 
Model 1 0.219 0.094 2.56** 
Model 2 0.131 0.060 2.16** 
Model 3 0.092 0.048                    1.57 
Model 4 0.074 0.013 2.02** 
Model 5 0.129 0.055 2.30** 
Model 6 0.091 0.044                    1.73* 
Model 7 0.069 0.012 2.05** 
 
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level of significance. 
**denotes statistical significance at the 5% level of significance. 
***denotes statistical significance at the 1% level of significance. 
 
 
Table 2.11 Comparison of MDBP Spillover Index Coefficients With an Equally Weighted 







Two sample t-test for   
MDBP Index Coefficient 
Equality 
t value 
Model 1 0.219 0.111   2.32** 
Model 2 0.131 0.074 1.81* 
Model 3 0.092           0.061                  1.18 
Model 4 0.074 0.020 1.85* 
Model 5 0.129 0.070  1.95* 
Model 6 0.091 0.057 1.34 
Model 7 0.069 0.019  1.92* 
 
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level of significance. 
**denotes statistical significance at the 5% level of significance. 




Table 2.12 Comparison of MDBP Spillover Index Coefficients With a Market Value 





Two sample t-test for   
MDBP Index Coefficient Equality 
t value 
Model 1 0.219 0.104   2.35** 
Model 2 0.134 0.048  2.24** 
Model 3 0.070           0.037 0.94 
Model 4 0.025         -0.006 1.06 
Model 5 0.118 0.049    2.32** 
 Model 6 0.059 0.037 0.70 
Model 7 0.016          -0.005 0.83 
 
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level of significance. 
**denotes statistical significance at the 5% level of significance. 
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                                                             APPENDIX 
 
A.1 Calculation of an Individual MDBP’s Unfunded Liabilities 
I give a numerical example showing the calculation of an individual MDBP’s 
unfunded liabilities: 
Plan Data              ($ in millions) 
RPA 94 Liability                     8,000 
Current Value of Net Assets                   6,000 
MDBP’s unfunded liability=  
0.9 x (RPA 94 Liability-Current Value of Net Assets) x 0.5 
= 0.9 x (8,000 - 6,000) x 0.5 = $900 million 
 
                                      A.2 Calculation of Company’s Share of  
                                                MDBP Unfunded Liabilities 
I give a numerical example showing the calculation of three schedule R companies’ 
share of the MDBP unfunded liabilities: 
Total Employer Contributions                 $100 million 
Schedule R Data                                         ($ millions) 
Company A’s contributions           40 
Company B’s contributions         20 





Schedule R Company’s share of MDBP unfunded liabilities=  
Company’s contributions/ Max (Schedule MB Total Employer Contributions, Schedule R 
Total Employer Contributions) 
Company A’s share of MDBP unfunded liabilities=40/100=40% 
Company B’s share of MDBP unfunded liabilities=20/100=20% 
Company C’s share of MDBP unfunded liabilities=25/100=25% 
I estimate a company’s individual plan MDBP ongoing38 liabilities by multiplying the 
company’s share of the MDBP unfunded liabilities by the MDBP’s unfunded liabilities.  I 
give a numerical example showing the calculation of each Schedule R company’s share of 
the MDBP liability: 
MDBP Plan Unfunded Liabilities                               $900 million 
Company Share  
Company A            40% 
Company B                      20% 
Company C                       25% 
Company A’s share of MDBP Unfunded liabilities = 
Company A’s share x MDBP Unfunded Liabilities = 40% of $900 million=$360 million 
Company B’s share of MDBP liabilities =  
Company B’s share x MDBP Unfunded Liabilities = 20% of $900 million =$180 million 
Company C’s share of MDBP liabilities = 
Company C’s share x MDBP Unfunded Liabilities =25% of $900 million =$225 million 
                                                          
38 My estimate of a firm’s individual MDBP liabilities is not an estimate of the firm’s withdrawal liability 
but rather an estimate of the firm’s ongoing MDBP liability.  Moody’s (2009) explain that a MDBP 
withdrawal liability will nearly always be higher than the firm’s current share of the unfunded MDBP 





                           A.3 Calculating LMS MDBP Liabilities in the Three  
                 Public Company Case 
I give a numerical example showing how I calculate LMS MDBP liability spillovers for 
Company A when three public companies are listed on the MDBP Form 5500 Schedule R. 
($ millions) 
Total Employer Contributions 100 
Company A’s contributions 40 
Company B’s contributions 20 
Company C’s contributions 25 
Company A’s share of MDBP liabilities 360 
Company B’s share of MDBP liabilities 180 
Company C’s share of MDBP liabilities 225 
A’s new share of MDBP unfunded liabilities upon B and C’s bankruptcy = 
Company A’s plan year contributions divided by the total employer contributions minus the 
sum of company B’s and company C’s contributions)  = 40 / (100- (20+25)) = 8/11 
LMS Liability Spillover onto Company A in the event that both Company B and Company 
C become bankrupt = Company A’s new share of MDBP liabilities x sum of Company B’s 






A.4 Calculating 1-year Expected MDBP Liabilities in  
the Two Public Company Case 
I give a numerical example showing how I calculate 1-year expected MDBP liability 
spillovers when there are two public companies listed on the MDBP Form 5500 Schedule 
R: 
                                ($ millions) 
Total Employer Contributions                                               100  
Company A’s contributions                        40 
Company B’s contributions                     20 
Company A’s share of unfunded MDBP liabilities            360 
Company B’s share of unfunded MDBP liabilities                           180 
Company A’s bankruptcy probability              0.1 
Company B’s bankruptcy probability                                                 0.2    
A’s new share of MDBP unfunded liabilities upon B’s bankruptcy =  
Company A’s contributions / (Total Employer Contributions– Company B’s contributions) 
=40/ (100-20) =0.5 
Company A’s expected liability spillover from company B =A’s new share of MDBP 
liabilities x B’s MDBP liability x B’s bankruptcy probability x Complement of A’s 
bankruptcy probability = 0.5 x 180 x 0.2 x (1-0.1) =$16.2 million 
B’s new share of MDBP unfunded liabilities upon A’s bankruptcy =  
Company B’s contributions / (Total Employer Contributions – Company A’s 
contributions)   = 20/ (100-40) =1/3 
Company B’s expected liability spillover from company A = B’s new share of MDBP liabilities x 





probability= 1/3 x 360 x 1/3 x 0.1x (1-0.2) =$ 9.6 million 
 
A.5 Calculating 1-year Expected MDBP Liabilities in the  
Three Public Company Case 
When there are three public companies listed on the MDBP Form 5500 Schedule R, I 
calculate the 1-year expected MDBP liability spillover onto company A from companies 
B and C as follows:   
 Expected MDBP liability spillover onto company A= 
Expected Liability Spillover when only company B goes bankrupt + 
Expected Liability Spillover when only company C goes bankrupt + 
Expected Liability Spillover when both companies B and C go bankrupt  
I give a numerical example illustrating how I calculate 1-year expected MDBP liability 
spillovers for Company A when three public companies are listed on the MDBP Form 5500 
Schedule R. 
 ($ millions) 
Total Employer Contributions 100 
Company A’s contributions 40 
Company B’s contributions 20 
Company C’s contributions 25 
Company A’s share of MDBP liabilities 360 
Company B’s share of MDBP liabilities 180 
Company C’s share of MDBP liabilities 225 





Company B’s bankruptcy probability                                               0.2
Company C’s bankruptcy probability                                               0.3
I calculate expected MDBP liability spillovers for the three different outcomes: only 
Company B goes bankrupt, only Company C goes bankrupt and both Company B and 
Company C go bankrupt. 
 
A.5.1 Only Company B Goes Bankrupt 
A’s new share of MDBP unfunded liabilities upon B’s bankruptcy =  
Company A’s contributions / (Total Employer Contributions – Company B’s MDBP 
Contributions) = 40 / (100-20) = 0.5 
Expected Liability Spillover onto Company A in the event that only Company B goes 
bankrupt 
= Company A’s new share of MDBP liabilities x Company B’s MDBP liability x Company 
B’s bankruptcy probability x Complement of Company C’s bankruptcy probability x 
Complement of Company A’s bankruptcy probability = 0.5 x 180 x 0.2 x (1-0.3) x (1-0.1) 
= $11.34 million 
 
A.5.2 Only Company C Goes Bankrupt 
A’s new share of MDBP unfunded liabilities upon C’s bankruptcy = Company A’s 
contributions / (Total Employer Contributions– Company C’s MDBP contributions) 
 = 40 / (100-25) = 8/15.  
Expected Liability Spillover onto Company A in the event that only Company C goes 
bankrupt = Company A’s new share of MDBP liabilities x Company C’s MDBP liability 
x Company C’s bankruptcy probability x Complement of Company B’s bankruptcy 





= 8/15 x 225 x 0.3 x (1-0.2) x (1-0.1) = $25.92 million 
 
A.5.3 Company B and Company C Goes Bankrupt 
A’s new share of MDBP unfunded liabilities upon B and C’s bankruptcy = 
Company A’s plan year contributions divided by the total employer contributions minus 
the sum of company B’s and company C’s contributions)  = 40 / (100- (20+25)) = 8/11 
Expected Liability Spillover onto Company A in the event that both Company B and 
Company C become bankrupt = Company A’s new share of MDBP liabilities x sum of 
Company B’s and Company C’s MDBP liability x Company B’s bankruptcy probability x 
Company C’s bankruptcy probability x Complement of Company A’s bankruptcy 
probability = 8/11 x (180+225) x 0.3 x 0.2 x (1-0.1) = $15.90545 million 
 




 ($ millions) 
Only Company B goes bankrupt       11.34 
Only Company C goes bankrupt 25.92 
Company B  and C goes bankrupt      15.90545 
Total                   53.17 
 
